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ABSTRACT OF THE DISSERTATION
Factors Predicting Disrupted Versus Continuous Memory for Child Sexual Abuse
by
Tami Lorraine Young
Doctor of Philosophy, Graduate Program in Psychology
Loma Linda University, June 2003
Dr. Janet Sonne, Chairperson

Information regarding the nature of disrupted memory for childhood sexual abuse
(CSA) is limited. To increase understanding, repressive coping, dissociative tendencies,
and characteristics of CSA were measured via survey in college students to determine if
they predicted disrupted memory for CSA. Dissociative tendencies, but not repressive
coping, predicted disrupted memory. Furthermore, repressive coping and dissociative
tendencies were negatively correlated in those with disrupted memory for CSA.
Characteristics of CSA loaded onto four factors: less physically intrusive CSA,
significantly intrusive CSA, pornographic exploitative CSA and psychological impact of
CSA. The psychological impact of CSA factor, greater number of years abused, and the
ability to provided evidence of CSA, best predicted disrupted memory for CSA. Results
suggest that dissociative tendencies may be a mechanism by which memories for CSA
are disrupted. Furthermore, the psychological impact of CSA may be a more direct
determinant than type of CSA in predicting disrupted memory for CSA.

XL

Introduction

“If there is any single formulation that encompasses the complex features of
psychoanalysis and related psychodynamic theories, it is that a considerable portion of
human thought, communication, social behavior, or psychological symptomology
involves more or less successful efforts to ward off from consciousness or from
observation by others a variety of threatening conflictual cognitive contents or emotional
reactions.” (Singer, 1990, p. xi).

Childhood sexual abuse (CSA) appears to be a widespread social, familial and
psychological problem. Estimates suggest that from 13 to 45% of men and 27 to 45% of
women remember being sexually abused as children. The effects upon adult victims are
pronounced and varied, and include greater incidents of depression, anxiety and anger
than in the general population; negative distortions in perceptions of self and others;
externalized emotional distress and interpersonal difficulties; and post traumatic effects
such as flashbacks, nightmares and intrusive thoughts (Berliner & Elliott, 1996).
Accurate understanding and treatment of CSA in adult victims is important for recovery
from this often-debilitating trauma.
One controversial and much-debated sequelae of CSA involves amnesia for the
incident, which may occur in one third or more of sexual abuse experiences (Williams,
1994). The debate, continuing into a second decade with little resolution, involves the
validity of traumatic memory loss for CSA. Many mental health professionals believe
that disruption of memory for CSA occurs and, when it does occur, represents a
pathological process (Pezdek, 1994). Others hold that little evidence exists either
anecdotally or empirically to support such a premise (Kilstrom, 1996 ; Schacter, Norman,
&Koutstaal, 1997).
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The Validity of Traumatic Memory Loss and Recovery
The Quality of the Memory Loss
The objections to the assertion that those who are sexually abused as children may
have traumatic amnesia for the abuse, then later recover the memories, are varied. Some
argue that anecdotal information regarding memory loss and recovery for CSA does not
correspond to other descriptions of traumatic amnesia, and, therefore, may not be valid.
For instance, Schacter, Norman, and Koutstaal (1997), reviewed the literature regarding
psychogenic amnesia and concluded that while it can account for instances of memory
loss related to certain psychologically traumatizing events, psychogenic amnesia cannot
explain memory loss related to CSA. Most forms of psychogenic amnesia, they argue,
involve memory loss for large segments of autobiographical memory usually preceding
the traumatizing event. Furthermore, this memory loss creates significant life disruption
(such as with loss of identity or Dissociative Identity Disorder). They argue that neither
pervasive memory loss, nor significant life disruption from the memory loss per se, is
common in amnesia for CSA. They also note that with functional retrograde amnesia
(psychologically motivated memory loss for events occurring before the onset of the
amnesia), the memories are usually, but not always, recovered after a relatively short
while. Alternately, amnesia for abuse remains for decades.
Interestingly, definitions of psychologically motivated amnesia do not support
Schacter and colleagues’ (1997) position that psychogenic amnesia always covers broad
sections of time (Hinsie & Campbell, 1970; Chaplin, 1975). Instead, the inability to
remember discrete events related to the trauma, rather than an inability to remember large
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segments of time, is the primary characteristic that distinguishes psychogenic amnesia
from amnesia incurred as a result of brain injury.
Furthermore, psychotherapists report that memory loss for large segments of time
does at times occur in response to repeated trauma (Terr, 1988). Schacter et al. (1997)
acknowledge this, but hold that the lack of life disruption in response to memory loss for
a large period of time calls into question the validity of the memory loss experience. Yet,
survivors of CSA are somewhat unique among those who claim disrupted memory from
trauma, because the traumatizing event occurred while they were young. Certainly,
traumatic memory loss that occurs for relatively recent events, and therefore includes
critical information about how one conducts his/her affairs, or includes disrupted identity,
is likely to be very disabling. Alternately, it seems probable that traumatic amnesia for a
period of autobiographical memory from childhood involving information about the birth
of a sibling or one’s third grade teacher, would be less troublesome.
Finally Schacter et al. (1997) do not offer anecdotal support for the claim that
traumatic memory loss is not disruptive at all for those who experienced CSA. It is
therefore unclear upon what criteria they base their claim. In fact, it seems likely that
individuals do find it disturbing, while perhaps not debilitating, to have no memory for
important family events such as a special Christmas.
Therapist and Client Self-Reports of Disrupted Memory For CSA
Continuing their examination, Schacter et al. (1997) reviewed client self reports
and criticized their lack of precision in defining “memory loss”. Specifically, they
question whether individuals are accurately reporting upon their own niemory loss and
recovery. The authors suggest, for instance, that perhaps clients might have meant to say
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that they had simply avoided thinking about the abuse for a period of time rather than
having an inability to recall it.
Certainly, self-reports have weaknesses that include lack of clarity for the
constructs being measured. It is unclear, for instance, whether an individual defines
memory loss as an inability to remember an incident, or as success in avoiding thinking
about it. Increased precision in such definitions might lower the percentages of those
reporting traumatic memory loss, but would be unlikely, given the large portion of those
reporting it, to eliminate all accounts. All retrospective client self-report studies reviewed
reported that a portion of those with a history of CSA or other abuse had disrupted
memory for the abuse for a period of time (Briere & Conte, 1993; Cameron, 1996;
Feldman-Summers & Pope, 1994; Herman & Schatzow, 1978; Loftus, Polonsky, &
Fullilove, 1994; Polusny & Follette,1996). With the definition of memory loss ranging
from partial or moderate to complete memory loss for the episode, the percentage of
those with amnesia ranged from 26 % (Herman & Schatzow, 1978) to 60% (Briere &
Conte, 1993).
In addition to their examination of anecdotal accounts of memory loss and
recovery for CSA, Schacter et al. (1997) also criticized studies involving retrospective
therapist reports of client accounts of disrupted memory for CSA. They argue that
independent verification, apart from chents’ subjective experience for the abuse, was not
obtained.
Those investigating this area empirically have begun to consider the importance
of independent verification, or corroboration, of the target incident. Several of the selfreport studies report corroboration for accounts of recovered memories of abuse with
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rates when provided ranging from 50 to 75% (Cameron, 1996; Feldman-Summers &
Pope, 1994; Herman & Schatzow, 1987).
Corroboration provides one method of addressing legitimate concerns regarding
suggestibility and memory implantation as an alternative explanation for reports of
memory recovery. In fact, the False Memory Syndrome Foundation, an organization
formed to identify and support those believed to have false memories of abuse and those
accused of the abuse, lists failure to find corroboration for the remembered abuse as one
criteria for false memory (Pope & Brown, 1996).
Some researchers espouse very high standards for corroboration, disallowing
victim reports of family members and others who have substantiated the abuse and accept
only those accounts directly verified by a treating clinician or researcher (see Brewin &
Andrews, 1997). Kluft (1996), however, has established more realistic standards which
include: reports from those who witnessed the event to the therapist, client, another
medical professional or a legal professional; oral or written confession from the alleged
perpetrator; and/or legal documentation. Developing consistent standards such as these
will strengthen their use in validating reported recovered memories of abuse.
It does appear, however, that even when more stringent standards are met for
corroboration, traumatic memory loss for CSA remains evident. Williams (1994)
obtained independent verification of self-reports of abuse by conducting follow up
interviews of women who were victims of medically documented CSA in years prior.
One hundred twenty-nine adult women who were victims of documented CSA were
interviewed an average of 17 years following the abuse. Detailed questions about a
history of sexual abuse were included as part of the interview, ostensibly regarding health
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and well-being. Thirty-eight percent of those interviewed did not remember the target
incident and 12 % did not remember any sexual abuse. It remains unknown, of course.
whether any of those who had verifiable memory loss for the CSA will recover memories
of the abuse. Therefore, while this study offers strong external verification of abuse, it
does not directly offer support for memory recovery.
In summary, it appears that client self-reports suggest that traumatic memory loss
and recovery does occur in a substantial minority of victims of CSA. While client
measurement of memory disruptions lacks precision, evidence related to independent
verification of the abuse strongly suggest that in some cases disrupted memory for CSA
and subsequent memory recovery does occurs.
The Etiology of Memory Loss
Another question regarding client self report of memory disruption for CSA is the
age at which the memory loss was reported (Kihlstrom, 1996). For many individuals who
report amnesia for childhood sexual abuse, the traumatic event occurred at or before the
age of seven, a time in development during which memory is affected by infantile
amnesia. Therefore, it is possible that the inability to remember childhood abuse may not
be due to a process related to the traumatic nature of the event, but may be a product of
normal childhood development.
In response to such questions regarding age, the previously mentioned Williams
study (1994) suggests that a mechanism other than infantile amnesia is required to
explain memory loss for CSA. If those under the age of seven are excluded from the
sample, 28% still did not remember the sexual abuse. Schacter et al. (1997) and
Kihlstrom (1996) allow that abuse occurring more than a decade before can be forgotten.

7
as with those in the Williams study; however they parsimoniously attribute the memory
loss to normal forgetting in which no special properties need be invoked because of the
trauma. Instead, they argue, the memory loss may be due to gradual decay of
unrehearsed memory traces or interference processes resulting in the decreased likelihood
of the traumatic memory being retrieved.
In a similar vein, Loftus and colleagues also argue that normal forgetting may
account for many, if not all, incidents of memory loss regarding CSA (Loftus, Garry &
Feldman, 1994; Garry, Loftus & Brown, 1994). Taking issue with the application of the
terms repression and amnesia to describe memory loss, they hold that forgetting is a
much more common cognitive occurrence than remembering; therefore, there is no
reason to look to more unusual explanations to account for the inability to remember
CSA.
Brewin and Andrews (1997) have challenged this suggesting that the gist of
autobiographical memory (AM) is usually accurate. In fact, most laboratory research
examining the relationship between emotion and memory in general finds that stimuli
eliciting a strong emotional response are better remembered than neutral stimuli (Bower,
1992; Heuer & Reisberg, 1992 ). In certain studies, however, the reverse is true — stimuli
with a strong emotional valence are remembered less well (Clifford & Hollen, 1981).
Yet in each case, the ability to remember stimuli that elicit a strong emotion is different
from the ability to remember neutral events, suggesting a different process is occurring
from normal forgetting.
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False Memory and Suggestibility
Many mental health professionals hold that some accounts of disturbed memories
of CSA are true and some may represent suggestive implantation (Alpert et al, 1998;
Pezdek, 1996). Furthermore, a minority do not beheve adequate support exists for
traumatic memory loss and recovery. For those mental health professionals, false
memory is an explanation offered for many (and in some cases all) accounts of such
occurrences.
Suggestibility is a concept central to false or implanted memories. The closely
related misinformation effect is a phenomenon in which false information about an event
is introduced following the event and is inaccurately incorporated into memory of the
event (Garry & Loftus, 1994). Of particular interest is the use of this paradigm not only to
insert false details into an existing memory, but also to suggest entire episodes or events
from one’s past. In a rather famous experiment by Loftus (1993), a family member
presented three actual events from childhood and one false event (such as being lost in
the mall) to five college students. The students were asked to write about each of the
events every day for five days. At the end of five days all five subjects believed the false
memory to be a true memory from childhood.
It is theorized that source monitoring difficulties (confusion remembering when,
where, and how a memory was acquired) is a factor in examples of false memory such as
the “lost in the mall” example (Schacter et al., 1997). Investigators argued that the
subjects accepted the memory as truth because they could not distinguish between the
repetitive thinking about the event and an event from childhood as the source of the
memory.
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Certainly such evidence as this, and that found in subsequent research, suggests
that it is possible for individuals to come to believe an event occurred in their personal
history that in fact did not. Whether this extends to such aversive and intimate
experiences as CSA remains to be seen. While many individuals have retracted stories of
abuse, Pezdek (1994) notes it is possible that such reversals are psychologically
motivated and may not indicate that the memory in question is false. Furthermore, she
observes, in cases of retraction stories, little independent verification has been offered to
show that retracted accounts of abuse did not actually take place.
Another criteria of interest related to false memory for CSA involves whether
reported memories return before or after the individual enters psychotherapy. This area is
of particular interest because of the suspicion that the psychotherapy milieu may act as a
catalyst for false memories, because of the therapist’s authority vis a vis the client and the
suggestibility of certain psychotherapeutic interventions (Lindsay & Read, 1994; Loftus,
1993). Indeed while memories return for some during psychotherapy, for many others
they return prior to entering treatment, if treatment is sought at all. Psychotherapists, in
fact, report that one quarter to three quarters of clients who recovered memories of abuse
did so before beginning treatment (Andrews et al, 1999; Cameron, 1994; Palm &
Gibson, 1998;). It seems probable, then, that in many instances in which individuals have
recovered memories, the treatment was sought in response to the returning memories.
Laboratory Research in Traumatic Memory Loss
In addition to the clinical research, directed forgetting, a cognitive paradigm
reviewed by Brewin and Andrews (1998), is theorized to support traumatic memory loss
and recovery. In related laboratory experiments, individuals are presented with stimuli in
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the form of a word list and then are asked to forget some of the words and remember
others. In tests of recall, individuals were able to remember more of the words from the
to-be-remembered group than for the to-be-forgotten group. The effect was stronger if
whole sets of items were to be remembered or to be forgotten (as in the first half of the
list) and weaker if subsets of items were to be forgotten (“forget all the animals”). In tests
of recognition, however, there was no difference between the to-be-forgotten material
and the to-be-remembered material.
Brewin and Andrews (1998) contend that such experiments suggest it is possible
to willfully forget chosen material, as may be the case with memory loss for trauma. In
addition, because the to-be-forgotten material was recognized as well as the to-beremembered material in recognition tests, it is theorized that the forgotten material may
later be remembered with the appropriate cues. This paradigm offers stronger support for
memory loss for entire events (perhaps such as CSA) rather than for segments of events,
because the ability to forget was stronger for entire sets of stimuli (e.g. the first half of the
list) than it was for subsets (e.g. all animals on the list).
In addition to directed forgetting, another laboratory paradigm, attentional
inhibition, may bear a relationship to traumatic memory loss. Experiments have been
conducted in which subjects were presented with a series of items representing positive
and negative life events. They were then shown a positive or negative adjective and were
asked to say whether or not the adjective described them. While it was hypothesized that
negative life events would result in endorsing negative adjectives more quickly, in reality
individuals took more time, not less, to endorse negative adjectives as self-descriptive.
Brewin and Andrews (1998) theorize that this represents an attention inhibition process
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designed to protect against negative self-evaluation and may, as an extension of directed
forgetting, also aid in the loss of memory for trauma.
In summary, mental health clinicians have been confronted with client reports and
appearances of memory disturbances for a century and, undoubtedly, will continue to be
confronted. Some cognitive psychologists doubt the validity of traumatic memory loss
and recovery. Yet a variety of factors, including the frequency with which disrupted
memory is reported, independent verification, the occurrence of memory recovery outside
of the therapy environment and certain laboratory research paradigms, suggest that
traumatic memory loss and memory recovery for CSA does occur.
Theorized Mechanisms for Traumatic Memory Loss
While it appears that individuals do experience traumatic memory loss for CSA
and later recover those memories, the mechanisms by which this occurs remain unclear.
While the previously mentioned cognitive paradigms of directed forgetting and
attentional inhibition hold promise, the most commonly offered explanations are the
psychodynamic theories of dissociation and repression. These time-honored concepts,
developed approximately one hundred years ago, have waxed and waned in popularity
over the decades. Interest in dissociation has increased when veterans return from the
wars with Post Traumatic Stress Disorder, and is currently prominent due to the
popularization of Dissociative Identity Disorder (previously known as Multiple
Personality Disorder). Both dissociation and repression are also currently receiving
attention as possible mechanisms involved in traumatic memory loss and recovery from
CSA.
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Confusion Regarding the Constructs ofDissociation and Repression
Considering the resiliency and longevity of the concepts of dissociation and
repression, it is surprising that little agreement exists regarding the phenomena each
construct represents and how one relates to the other. Pierre Janet (1859 - 1947) who
treated dissociative splits in the personality with hypnosis, believed that dissociation,
which he called “desagregation”, was the mind’s primary unconscious defense and that
repression was a specific form of dissociation. Alternately, Freud, after rejecting his own
sexual seduction theory, argued that psychopathology was caused by repression of
consciously unacceptable, instinctual childhood sexual and aggressive impulses. With
this shift he rejected the notion of dissociation as an important explanatory concept for
mental illness and replaced it with the construct of repression (Wright, 1997). In
addition, Freud believed, in contrast to Janet’s ideas, that repression involved a distinctly
separate process from dissociation (Kihlstrom & Hoyt, 1990).
Such disparity continues today. Current conceptualizations of dissociation and
repression vary greatly among theorists, as does the understanding of how they relate to
each other. Building on Freud’s perspective and Rappaport’s Work, Singer (1990) has
theorized, in contrast to Janet’s conceptualization, that repression can be defined as a
broad, defensive function that prevents an unconscious idea, potentially conflictual, from
entering into awareness. Using that definition, he considers dissociation to be a specific
mechanism of repression in which an idea is kept from consciousness via a cognitive
splitting mechanism.
A common distinction between dissociation and repression involves how the
unconscious material is cut off from consciousness and therefore how accessible it is. In
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this conceptualization, repression involves a schematic horizontal split in the mind
between conscious and unconscious material, rendering the unconscious material
unavailable to conscious access under any circumstances, although its effects might be
observed in behavior. On the other hand, dissociation is conceptualized as a vertical
split, segregating certain cognitive material from other conscious material This barrier
prevents conscious access to the split off ideas and memories, although, in contrast to the
repressive horizontal split, in theory the material remains accessible (Kihlstrom & Hoyt,
1990).
Other distinctions between dissociation and repression involve the insulation of
the unavailable material from the rest of consciousness that in turn affects the quality of
the memory when it reemerges (Brewin & Andrews, 1998). In such a framework,
repression occurs after a period of time in which the cognitive material is conscious and
has integrated with other autobiographical information. When the material reemerges, it
is not experienced as foreign and re-integration with other autobiographical material
occurs with relative ease.
Alternately, in this conceptualization, dissociation may involve a memory being
separated from consciousness before much cognitive processing takes place. It also then
re-emerges in an unprocessed, primitive form and the experience of its return as an
emotion or as a sensory event may interrupt the flow of consciousness. This quality of
reemergence hinders the isolated material from being easily integrated into other
autobiographical material.
Another distinction between the two seems to exclude dissociation entirely as an
explanation for disrupted memory for abuse. Vaillant (1990) distinguishes dissociation
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from repression by the quality of cognitive material that is held outside of conscious
awareness. In his distinction, repression involves sphtting off memories of events, or
ideational memories, but leaves the associated affect available to consciousness. On the
other hand, dissociation occurs when the ideational memory is left intact, but the
associated affect is unconscious. Vaillant explains:
If a man were weeping in a cemetery but could not recall for whom he wept, this
would be repression. If he denied the existence of his tears, that would represent
psychotic denial. If he got the giggles or got drunk at the wake, that would be
dissociation (neurotic denial). If he said he wept from happiness, that would be
reaction formation. If he brushed aside his tears, said he would think about his
father’s death tomorrow and indeed remembered to grieve the next day, that
would be suppression. (Vaillant, 1990, p. 261 - 262).
Finally, Gardena (1994) whose own review of conceptual models of dissociation
subsumes repression as a subtype, astutely advises that there are no generally accepted
distinctions between dissociation and repression in the literature.
Theoretical Constructs of Dissociation
Predictably, the lack of clarity between dissociation and repression clearly results
from diverse conceptualizations of each construct. Dissociation, in particular, covers a
wide range of phenomena from certain normal everyday experiences to pathological
alterations in identity. A thorough consideration of all theoretical approaches to
dissociation is the work of many volumes. For more comprehensive coverage, the reader
is referred to Lynn and Rhue’s edited work, Dissociation: Clinical and Theoretical
Perspectives (1994).
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Cardena’s organization of dissociative experiences. In an attempt to encompass
the various conceptualizations of dissociation, Cardena (1997) has developed a two axes
organization of dissociative manifestations (see Figure 1). Cardena classifies dissociative
experiences along a range from pathological to normal (the vertical axis). Acts
performed outside of awareness, such as driving while talking (automatisms) fall in the
normal range, while maladies such as Dissociative Identity Disorder (DID) are
considered pathological.

Patho ogical
Blindsight

MPD/DID

Commissurotomy

Depersonalization/derealization

Organic amnesia*

Dissociative amnesia

Epileptic fugues

Dissociative fugues

Hemi neglect

Conversion disorders

Neurological

Psychological
Hypnosis

State-dependent learning

Out-of-body experiences

Sleep amnesia

Automatisms
Implicit perception/memory

Normal
Figure 1: Gardena’s organization of dissociative phenomena.

A horizontal axis encompasses the neurological versus psychological etiology of
the phenomenon. State-dependent learning and sleep amnesia are considered to have
neurological etiologies, while hypnosis and out-of body experiences are considered to be
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of psychological origin. In this framework, dissociative amnesia is considered a
pathological process of psychological origin.
Cardena ’s three conceptualizations of dissociation. Cardena (1994) also outlines
various conceptualizations of dissociation that include three major uses of the term and
their underlying assumptions. The first and second uses are descriptive; that is, they
merely describe a phenomenon. The third is explanatory and offers a theoretical
explanation for dissociative processes.
The first, and most broadly defined conceptualization, describes dissociation as
nonconscious or nonintegrated mental modules or systems. It includes three
subcategories, the first of which includes any alternative mental processes, including
many every day experiences brought about by attentional limitations in which the
unconscious activity becomes accessible when attention is called to it. For instance, it is
possible to remain unaware of one’s driving behavior while conversing with someone in
the car. Yet if a one sees red taillights ahead, driving behavior becomes immediately
conscious. This defimtion of dissociation includes all dissociative experiences whether
healthy or pathological, and of psychological or neurological etiology.
The second subcategory of Gardena’s first major conceptualization of
dissociation, defines it as the coexistence of separate mental systems that should be
integrated, but are not. It “applies to mental processes, such as sensations, thoughts,
emotions, volition, memories, and identities, that we would ordinarily expect to be
integrated within the individual’s stream of consciousness and the historically extended
self, but which are not” (Cardena, 1994, p. 19). This subcategory of dissociation, while
more narrow than the first, includes dissociative amnesia as well as other pathological
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expressions such as DID and fugue states, as well as normal neurological manifestations
such as state-dependent learning. It, however, excludes normal divisions in attention
such as those mentioned in the first subcategory.
This second subcategory includes Hilgard’s neodissociative theory. Rather than a
simple division between realms of conscious and unconscious material, this prominent
conceptualization of dissociation uniquely postulates a hierarchical organization of
multiple cognitive structures (Hilgard, 1994). Extending from Janet’s work, this theory is
based in part on the discovery that during hypnosis with some highly hypnotizable
individuals it is possible to elicit an observing self who has access to the material blocked
by the hypnotic induction. One example of this involves a hypnosis experiment in which
individuals were instructed to keep one hand immersed in ice water without experiencing
discomfort. During the induction it was possible for some individuals to access a part of
consciousness that knew of the induction and reported the discomfort of the cold water.
So, rather than exemplifying only one split between the waking self and the hypnotized
self, Hilgard provided evidence for a second split separating those two from a third aspect
that was aware of the hypnotic process. Hilgard’s theory therefore suggests that the
nonintegration of mental modules that occurs in this description of dissociation may be
more complex than usually considered.
Gardena’s third subcategory of nonintegrated mental modules, involves
inconsistencies between an individual’s behavior (and/or objective reports of
physiological responses) and his/her introspective experience of the self. Most
commonly this manifests itself as disparity between reports of inner emotional experience
and objective measurements of it, such as the person who reports feeling calm but
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exhibits physiological arousal. While Cardena subsumes this disconnection between
affect and experience in the realm of dissociation, it is a hallmark characteristic of the
repressive coping style, to be reviewed in greater depth later.
This disconnection between introspective report and ongoing behavior also
includes hypnotic responses, conversion disorders and certain neurological syndromes
such, as blindsightedness (when, due to striate cortex damage, an individual reports
blindness on the side contralateral to the lesion but can accurately detect when light
flashes occur in that area of the visual field, to their own amazement).
Separation from the experienced self, or separation of the self from the
environment, characterizes Gardena’s second major conceptualization of dissociation.
While this perspective is less inclusive than the first, it usually involves a subjective
experience of disconnectedness and encompasses both healthy and pathological
manifestations of dissociation. It includes phenomena such as out-of-body experiences
that are reported during trauma^ depersonalization and derealization.
Finally, as previously mentioned, Gardena’s third conceptualization is explanatory
rather than descriptive, and offers an explanation for how it is that the previously
identified processes may be occurring. It defines dissociation as a defense mechanism,
initiated to safeguard the individual’s psychological integrity when confronted with an
ongoing danger or threat.
Operational Definitions of Dissociation
In spite of various theories of dissociation, one scale is consistently used to
measure it in clinical studies. The Dissociative Experiences Scale (DES) (Bernstein &
Putnam, 1986; Carlson & Putnam, 1993) is a 28 item self-report measure. The items
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were developed from experiences of individuals with dissociative disorders and from the
mental health professionals who specialize in their treatment. It asks about amnesic
experiences, gaps in awareness, depersonalization, derealization, absorption, and
imaginative involvement. The authors later developed a revision (DES II), which they
claimed was easier to score but did not alter any of the questions (Carlson & Putnam,
1993).
While the DES and DES II can be used with non-clinical populations, its primary
purpose is to distinguish dissociative disorders from other mental health disorders in
clinical populations (Bernstein & Putnam, 1986). In fact when used with non-clinical
populations, the distribution is positively skewed with a significant floor effect (Wright &
Loftus, 1999) making it difficult to discern relationships with other measures. The DES
II asks about a given experience (for instance, not remembering all or portions of a ride in
the car) and instructs the participant to rate the percentage of time this phenomenon
occurs, ranging from 0 to 100%.
An alternative form, the DES C (Wright & Loftus, 1999), was developed for use
with non-clinical populations. This version instructs the participant to rate how often the
experience occurs in relationship to other people, ranging from “much lessThan others” to
much more than others.” One weakness of DES C is its cultural relativity, because the
incidence of dissociative disorders varies among cultures. In addition, it requires
participants to make assumptions about how often each behavior in question occurs in the
general population and rate themselves accordingly. This precludes comparison of rating
among items in the same individual. For instance, when someone is asked if he/she at
times does not recognize friends or family members, he/she may assume that this rarely
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happens to most people. If this experience does not happen to him/her at all, he/she pray
indicate that this happens only somewhat less to him/her than to others. Alternatively, if
someone assumes that not remembering part of a car ride is a common experience among
people and he/she does not ever have this experience, then he/she may indicate that this
experience happens significantly less to them than to others. Even though he/she never
experienced either phenomenon, he/she has rated one as occurring less often than the
other in relationship to other people.
In spite of these limitations, the DES C holds promise. Wright and Loftus (1999)
found that those who had high scores on the DES II also had high scores on the DES C,
and DES C scores were more evenly distributed in non-clinical populations.
Because the DES in its various forms is the most widely used measure of
dissociation and has undergone the most methodological scrutiny (Wright & Loftus,
1999), the present investigation of dissociation will adopt the assumptions underlying its
selection of items. While the DES C is an atheoretical measure developed from clinical
experience, the selection of items coincides with Gardena’s first definition of dissociation
in its broadest form. As the reader will recall, this definition includes common divisions
of attention, reversible upon will (for instance, lack of awareness of driving behavior
while conversing). Further, all versions of the DES ask about normal experiences, as
well as pathological ones. Therefore, this investigation will define-dissociation as
including non-pathological as well as pathological experiences, of psychological or
neurological origins.
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Theoretical Constructs of Repression
Just as the term dissociation is characterized by varying conceptualizations, so is
the term repression. Certain definitions of repression can be broad and inclusive, as are
many definitions of dissociation; and just as with dissociation, repression can represent
healthy coping as well as pathological adjustment. While dissociation in its broadest
understanding includes the many ways the psyche can lack integration, definitions of
repression can include the many ways the psyche protects itself from awareness of
threatening stimuli, such as unacceptable sexual or aggressive impulses. Certain
conceptualizations of repression, as well as dissociation, include amnesia for trauma such
asCSA.
Repression as a specific defense. Repression is classified by many theorists as a
specific defense, rather than as a general one (Singer & Sincoff, 1990). Thus repression
takes on various distinctions depending on the theorist. Singer and Sincoff summarizing
various theoretical descriptions of repression as a specific defense, note several
commonly noted features and distinctions. First, several information processing theorists
depict repression as motivated forgetting and consider it to involve various cognitive
activities, such as the motivated non-learning, motivated non-rehearsal and motivated
non-retrieval of information.
Second, conceptual distinctions are made between the term repression and
suppression. For instance. Singer and Sincoff (1990) note that Kihlstrom and Hoyt
(1990) define suppression as a conscious, intentional pushing of material out of
awareness, most famously typified by Scarlett O’Hara in Gone With The Wind, when she
said, “I’ll think about that tomorrow.” Alternately, in repression, awareness does not
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exist for the banished material or for the act of banishment. These authors also
hypothesize that suppression and repression may be related. They question whether the
act of suppression, once it becomes an automatic behavior, may occur outside of
awareness, thus becoming repression.
Finally Singer and Sincoff (1990) note that a common psychoanalytic
consideration regarding repression is whether it is an active or passive process. It is
generally believed that the process is an active one, called “countercathexis”, requiring
active psychic energy to keep the material from emerging into consciousness.
Repression as a coping style. Broader considerations of repression define it as a
class of related defenses that comprise a repressive coping style (Singer & Sincoff, 1990).
Repressive coping is characterized by defensive avoidance or denial of unpleasant
stimuli, including places, events and/or emotional states. For example. Singer and
Bonanno (1990) characterize those with repressive personalities as placing “continuing
emphasis on avoidance of (1) potentially psychologically threatening social encounters or
(2) extended lines of associative thought that might lead to conscious awareness of
conflict or embarrassing experiences” (p. 441).
Operational Definitions of Repression
In the 1960s Byrne measured repressive personality on a single dimension of
sensitivity to negative affect on the Byrne Repression Sensitization scale (Byrne, 1961).
A high threshold for experiencing negative affect indicated a repressive personality on
this scale, and generally correlated with low levels of reported anxiety. While widely
used, Weinberger (1990) pointed out that Byrne’s scale does not distinguish well between
repressors, whose low anxiety scores represent psychological defensiveness, and those
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who are simply not anxious. To illustrate this concern, Weinberger, Schwartz and
Davidson (1979) measured physiological indicators of arousal in those who reported low
levels of anxiety and found that some who reported low levels manifested very high
levels of arousal. Such a pattern indicated a need to measure defensiveness as well as
anxiety in determining repressive coping. As Weinberger (1990) later noted, repressive
copers are individuals “who often beheve they are not upset, despite objective evidence
to the contrary” (p, 341).
Consequently Weinberger developed the Weinberger Repressive Coping Scale
(Weinberger, Schwartz, and Davidson, 1979) in which very low reported anxiety
combined with high levels of psychological defensiveness indicate repressive coping.
Anxiety is measured via the short form of the Taylor Manifest Anxiety Scale (Taylor,
1953) and psychological defensiveness with the Marlowe-Crowne Social Desirability
Scale (Crowne & Marlowe, 1960). The Marlowe-Crowne measures endorsement of rigid
standards of self-control, theorized to serve as self-esteem protection. For instance, it
includes statements that represent a high degree of social acceptability but are unlikely to
be true, such as “I never hesitate to go out of my way to help someone in trouble.” Such
a measurement of defensiveness underscores the centrality of self-control to repressive
coping, prompting Weinberger to further characterize such individuals as those “who do
not become upset, rather than individuals who enjoy themselves and adjust to life as it
unfolds” (Weinberger, 1990, p. 348).
Weinberger has further investigated related underlying personality traits and
found repressive coping to also be consistent with maintaining firm control over negative
affect and egoistic impulses (e.g., self-serving action or aggressive behavior).
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Weinberger’s Adjustment Scale (WAI) (1990) measures these perfectionistic
characteristics of repressive coping in a two dimensional typology. Subjective
experience of distress (including other negative emotions in addition to anxiety) and
suppression of egoistic desires, represent the two major dimensions, with low scores on
“distress” and high scores on “suppression” indicating repressive coping.
Weinberger’s conceptualization of repressive coping also distinguishes it from the
simple use of denial, a concept often invoked to describe defensive reports of low
anxiety. Repressors share more characteristics in common than simply denial of negative
affect, Weinberger argues. Repressors see themselves and are seen by others as very
responsible and non-impulsive, qualities not always characteristic of denial.
The present study will define repression broadly, as a constellation of personahty
characteristics comprising the repressive coping style. It will include Weinberger’s
foundational conceptualization of repressive coping as low reported anxiety combined
with high defensiveness. Further delineations, such as egoistic restraint will not be
included because of the greater complexity of Weinberger’s later measure.
Comparing Repressive Coping with Dissociative Experiences
The chosen assessment tools for this study include a measurement of the
repressive coping personality (as just mentioned) and of dissociative experiences. While
the reader will recall that little clarity exists between the theoretical constructs of
repression and dissociation, once operationalized in the forms chosen for this study,
certain distinctions can be drawn. Comparison of the two may be helpful in clarifying the
relationship between them.
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One difference involves the specificity of what is measured. Repressive coping,
for instance, represents a broad personality style employing multiple defense
mechamsms. Alternately, the DES C measures categories of experiences thought to
represent the dissociative processes. While evidence suggests an association between
dissociation and other personahty qualities such as suggestibility, hypnotizability and
fantasy proneness (Brenneis, 1997), the DES C does not measure such a constellation of
characteristics.
Comparison is possible, however, when repressive coping is broken down into its
specific defenses. Singer and Sincoff (1990), summarizing the perspectives of several
theorists, consider repressive coping to be comprised of the specific defense of
repression and denial. Such defenses are typically associated with avoidance of
awareness of threatening material. Denial does not involve memory loss, but defends the
psychological self by withholding conscious understanding of the meaning and
implications of what is perceived. Alternately, as the reader will recall. repression
involves withholding an idea or feeling from conscious awareness or pushing ideas deep
into the unconscious where they cannot be accessed (Singer & Sincoff, 1990).
Singer and Sincoff s (1990) distillation of dissociation suggests a very different
process involving a “severing of the connections between various ideas and emotions”
(p. 481). So while repression brings to mind images of buried cognitive material,
dissociation suggests ideas are scattered so that they cannot be found. (Such a distinction
may remind the reader of the previously described schematic descriptions between
repression and dissociation in which a horizontal division in consciousness represents
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repression, with repressed material existing below the division. A vertical split represents
dissociation, or separation of material that is normally integrated.)
Furthermore, a possible comparison may be drawn between individuals who
employ these defenses. It is possible, for instance, that those with dissociative tendencies
may appear fragmented and disconnected, while repressive copers may be characterized
as controlled and constricted.
Distinguishing Those With Disrupted Memory for Child Sexual Abuse From Those With
Continuous Memory
Thus far we have discussed the occurrence of disrupted memory for CSA and
have considered repression and dissociation as likely explanations for such memory loss.
An examination of those with disrupted memory for CSA when compared to those with
continuous memories may help to shed light on the degree to which repression,
dissociation and other factors may impact such memory loss and recovery.
Relationship ofMemory Disruption For CSA to Dissociation
Melchert (1999) and Sheiman (1999) found that college students with memory
loss for CSA had significantly higher DES (Dissociative Experiences Scale) scores than
did those with continuous memory. Curiously, in Sheiman’s study those with continuous
memory for the CSA had lower dissociative scores than did those in the control group
with no known history of CSA. While the authors did not report whether the latter
difference was statistically significant, it is interesting to consider that those who retain a
continuous memory for a traumatic event may be distinctive in their ability to do so.
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Relationship ofMemory Disruption of CSA to False Memory
Since there is ample evidence to suggest that false memories of CSA may occur,
and since psychotherapy has been thought to precipitate false memory, it is important to
consider whether or not a portion of those who reported disrupted memory of abuse may
have false memories. Clear criteria for distinguishing those with disrupted memory from
those with false memory do not exist. However, whether the memory can be verified and
whether it occurred in a possibly suggestive setting such as psychotherapy, provides
partial evidence about its validity. In a clinical sample of women in psychotherapy with a
history of CSA, 63 % received external verification (from another victim, a relative or the
perpetrator) and 73 % experienced their first memory before psychotherapy began
(Cameron, 1996). In Sheiman’s study, only two of the fourteen who reported disrupted
memory for the abuse said psychotherapy was a trigger for remembering. If the groups
who report disrupted memory include some with false memory, this preliminary evidence
suggests proportions were likely to be small.
Relationship Of Disrupted Memory For CSA To Repression
While it seems that disrupted memory for CSA bears a relationship to
dissociation, research has illuminated little about its relationship to repression. What
does seem fairly certain is that repression is related to remembering fewer negative
childhood memories. Those with a repressive coping style (as measured by low anxiety
and high psychological defensiveness) recalled fewer negative childhood memories in a
timed test office recall than did others (Davis & Schwartz, 1987). However, recalling
fewer negative childhood memories was not present with others who only had high
defensiveness, but who did not fit the repressive profile with low anxiety scores. The
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exclusive relationship between recalling fewer negative childhood memories and
repressive coping suggests that repression represents a unique defensive structure
distinguishable from mere psychological defensiveness.
It also seems that repressive coping is operative in forgetting certain negative
memories, but not others. Repressors’ avoidance of negative memories was greater for
the negative experiences of fear and self-consciousness, but not for sadness, and
disappeared entirely in retrieval of memories in which someone else felt the emotion
(Davis, 1987). That is, repressors did not report fewer memories of others having
emotional experiences and, in fact, they reported more of them than did those who were
not repressive copers. Such findings led Davis to speculate that repression serves to
protect against emotional experiences that focus attention on the self in an evaluative or
threatening way.
Such evidence lends support to the role of repressive coping in traumatic memory
loss for CSA. Typically, CSA is a highly personal and an often humiliating or
stigmatizing experience. Furthermore, sexual abuse is often accompanied by feelings of
fear and self-consciousness — those emotions most likely to be forgotten by repressive
copers. They may therefore find that remembering CSA as a part of autobiographical
memory is too threatening, at least for a period of time during one’s life.
Alternately, other evidence suggests that repression may not bear a relationship to
traumatic memory loss. Melchert’s (1999) previously mentioned study of victims of
child abuse also used Weinberger’s newer scale, the Weinberger Adjustment Inventory
(WAJ; 1990). In his sample, those with (mostly partial) memory loss for the abuse were
no more likely to exhibit a repressive coping style than those with continuous memory. It
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should be noted, however, that the internal consistency of repressive portions of the
Weinberger Adjustment Inventory (WAI) was weak (Cronbach’s alpha = .62) and the
author encourages discernment in interpreting results.
The Relationship Among Disrupted Memory of CSA, Dissociation and Repression
While it may be that repression and dissociation play a role in memory loss for
CSA, very preliminary evidence suggests that repressive coping is not occurring in the
same individuals with dissociative tendencies. Malinoski and Lynn (1999) found
dissociative tendencies (as measured by the DES) to be negatively correlated with the
Marlowe Crowne Social Desirability Scale (MCSDS). Since a high score on the MCSDS
is one indicator of repressive coping, this suggests that dissociation and repressive coping
may not be related. In addition DES scores were positively correlated with measures of
anxiety (The State-Trait Anxiety Inventory) and of psychological distress (The Brief
Symptom Inventory). As the reader will also recall, repressive coping is characterized by
low levels of reported anxiety or psychological distress, thus further indicating a
difference between dissociative tendencies and repressive coping.
Relationship ofMemory Disruption For CSA to Characteristics of The Abuse
In addition to differences in dissociative tendencies, individuals with disrupted
memory for abuse reported different CSA characteristics than those with continuous
memory. Those in Sheiman’s study (1999) who experienced disrupted memory, more
often knew the abuser well, feared for their lives, experienced touching of their sexual
organs or use of force, were abused for longer and liked the perpetrator. Similarly,
Cameron (1996) found that having a biological parent as perpetrator, experiencing one or
more forms of penetration or fellatio and experiencing sexual violence distinguished
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those with disrupted memory from other CSA victims. These criteria suggest that for
those with disrupted memories, frightening, violent sexual abuse occurs at the hands of a
known and trusted individual over a long period of time.
Relationship ofMemory Disruption For CSA to Victim Characteristics
Other characteristics of CSA involve qualities of the individual with memory
disruption. Those with disrupted memory appear to be less well adjusted, as measured by
the MMPI-2, than were those with continuous memory and both groups were less well
adjusted than the control group. Specifically, those with disrupted memory scored
significantly higher on hypochondriasis and hysteria than did the continuous memory
group or the control, suggesting that those with memory disruptions are likely to have
more physiological complaints, be less insightful and deny psychological problems more
than those with continuous memory (Greene, 1991).
It is interesting that the disrupted memory group did not differ from the
continuous memory group on the MMPI-2 repression supplementary scale, and neither
the disrupted nor the continuous group was higher than the control group. These findings
suggest that repression may not be characteristic of CSA victims. This scale, however,
measures constricted interest in surrounding events, a somewhat different repression
construct than those previously discussed and may or may not bear a clear relationship to
other constructs. The MMPI repression scale may also signify an unwillingnessto talk
about personal problems, rather than a defensive inability to remember (Greene, 1991).
Being younger at the time of the CSA has inconsistently predicted disrupted
memory for the abuse. It was found to predict disrupted memory in two clinical samples
drawn from individuals in psychotherapy (Briere, 1993; Cameron, 1996), but not in two
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other non-clinical samples (Elliott & Briere, 1995; Sheiman, 1999). Why therapy would
have a moderating effect on the relationship between age of first CSA and memory
disruption is unclear.
In summary, studies of disrupted memory for CSA victims suggest that
dissociative processes account, at least partially, for disrupted memory in contrast to
continuous memory. Alternately, little is known about what role repression may play in
traumatic memory loss for CSA. Repression appears to inhibit memory regarding
emotionally unpleasant childhood memories, particularly those in which the self is
regarded in a threatening or evaluative way. Such findings suggest that repression and
dissociation may both play a role in disrupted memory for CSA, although additional
evidence suggests they may not occur in the same individuals. Also, those with disrupted
memory appear to be distinct in the characteristics of the CSA that they experience and
may be also younger when the CSA began and somewhat less well adjusted than those
with continuous memory.
The Present Study
The present study further explored the differences between disrupted and
continuous memory for CSA. Primarily, it investigated the role of dissociation and
repression in distinguishing disrupted from continuous memory. Current evidence
defimtely suggests that those with disrupted memories have more dissociative tendencies
that those with continuous memory. It was less predictable whether repressive coping
would also distinguish those with disrupted memory. It was also unknown whether
dissociative tendencies and repressive coping would be operating in the same individuals
(suggesting they represent a similar psychological process) or seldom co-occur, as the
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Malinoski and Lynn study (1999) and the conceptual descriptions of each imply
(suggesting that they are distinct processes). This study therefore examined the
relationship between dissociative tendencies and memory for CSA, between repressive
coping and memory for CSA, and between repressive coping and dissociative tendencies.
In addition, as the reader will recall, Sheiman (1999) and Cameron (1996) found
that certain characteristics of the CSA experience were related to disrupted memory for
the event. This study expanded the examination of the relationship among characteristics
of the CSA experience and memory disruption for CSA. Specifically, it re-examined
certain characteristics previously measured, such as the intrusiveness of the abuse, how
well-known the perpetrator was to the victim, whether the perpetrator was a parent,
whether force or violence was used, and whether the victim was afraid. This study
included other characteristics not previously examined including whether the victim
confided in anyone about the abuse and whether the victim experienced humihation or
self-consciousness.
This study therefore examined the relationship among repressive coping,
dissociative tendencies and memory for CSA. Specifically it tested the following
hypotheses:
1. Dissociative tendencies is found more in those with disrupted memory for
CSA than in those with continuous memory.
2. Repressive coping is found more in those with disrupted memory for CSA than
in those with continuous memory. Alternately, as social desirability increases there is a
negative correlation between manifest anxiety (low) and memory disruption for CSA
(high).
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3. Dissociative tendencies and repressive coping are negatively correlated in
individuals with memory disruption for CSA.
4. Having been younger when the CSA began, having known the abuser well,
having feared for one’s life, having experienced penetration and having experienced
violence or use of force, are the qualities of CSA that best characterize those with
disrupted memory for CSA.

Method
Measures
All variable measurements were obtained from a questionnaire designed for the
purposes of this study by the graduate student investigator (see Appendix B). In this
survey, participants were asked to provide information in five areas: (a) general
demographics; (b) repressive coping (the Marlowe Crowne Social Desirability Scale and
the Taylor Manifest Anxiety Scale); (c) characteristics of the sexual abuse experiences;
(d) memory for the abuse; and (e) dissociative experiences (the Dissociative Experiences
Scale, version C). None of the three scales used are copyrighted.
General Demographics
A general demographics questionnaire was given to subjects including age,
gender and ethnicity.
Repressive Coping
The repressive coping score was obtained from administering the 20 item version
of the Taylor Manifest Anxiety Scale (TMAS) which measures trait anxiety and the 33
item Marlowe-Crown Social Desirability Scale (MCSDS) which measures psychological
defensiveness (Weinberger, Schwartz, & Davidson, 1979). Both use a true-false format
and provide continuous scores. The range of the shortened TMAS is 0 to 20 and the
MCSDS is 0 to 33. Low scores on the shortened TMAS combined with high scores on
the MCSDS indicate repressive coping.
The original TMAS was developed as an experimental measure of drive and
motivation in eyelid conditioning (Taylor, 1953). Two hundred items from the Minnesota
Multiphasic Personality Inventory (MMPI) were rated by judges against a definition of
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manifest anxiety. Sixty-five items were chosen as measuring manifest anxiety and were
later reduced to 50. Test retest reliability for three weeks was a Pearson product-moment
coefficient of .89 (N = 59) and for five to 17 months it was .81 (N ^ 163). The
distribution for a college undergraduate population was a mean score of 13 on the 50item scale ranging from 1 to 50. Hoyt and Magoon (1954) later found the TMAS to be a
reliable indicator of high versus medium or low anxiety levels in a clinical sample.
The shortened version of the TMAS eliminated 30 of the original 50 items
keeping the 20 most consistently valid items (Bendig, 1956). Internal consistency of the
shortened version was .76 when administered to a group of college students. The
intercorrelation between the 50-item and the 20-item version was .93.
The MCSDS was originally developed as a measure of test-taking bias (Crowne
& Marlowe, 1960), but has been found to be a poor measure of such bias, but an accurate
measure of repressive defensiveness (Weinberger, Schwartz, & Davidson, 1979).
Internal consistency using Kuder-Richardson formula 20 was found to be .88 when the
authors admimstered it to 39 undergraduate abnormal psychology students. It was also
positively correlated with the L and the K validity scales of the MMPI, for which high
scores indicate psychological defensiveness, and was negatively correlated with the K
scale, an indicator of expressed psychological distress.
For this study, reversed standardized (z) TMAS scores combined with
standardized (z) MCSDS scores created a repressive coping score with high scores
representing repressive coping. This method of scoring is a departure from previous
methods in which MCSDS scores in the upper quartile were combined with TMAS
scores below the median to create repressive coping. The current method was chosen
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because dichotomization of continuous variables results in the unnecessary loss of
variance and the resultant reduction of statistical power (Cohen, 1983; Gangestad &
Snyder, 1985; Maxwell, 1993).
Characteristics of the Sexual Abuse Experience
The types of CSA that occurred were assessed in a series of questions that
inquired about specific sexual behaviors. The questions included eight behavioral
descriptions ranging from requests for sexual involvement to intercourse adapted from
Finkelhor’s surveys regarding histories of sexual abuse (Peters, Wyatt, & Finkelhor,
1986). For five of the eight descriptions, two questions distinguished whether the
individual’s role was that of “receiver”, indicating that they were the recipient of the
activity, or “actor” in which they performed the activity on another person. Three other
behavioral descriptions involved only single questions for a total of thirteen behavioral
descriptions. Included in each question were queries regarding whether the event
occurred or was attempted, and the age at the time of the event. Only the data involving
actual occurrences, and not those involving attempts, were used for these analyses.
Penetration was assessed by determining from the CSA behavioral descriptions
whether sexual organs were touched in the course of CSA. Cases in which the CSA did
not involve touching of sexual organs received a value of one, while cases in which the
CSA involved touching of sexual organs received a value of two.
The frequency of the abuse was obtained by asking how many times each of the
types of CSA experiences occurred. The total for the types were summed and
standardized providing a CSA frequency score with higher scores representing greater
frequency.
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Participants often answered “all the time” or “too many to count” in response to
how frequently a type of abuse occurred. Because these descriptive responses suggested
a very high occurrence, a numeric response was created by adding five points to the
highest frequency given for that variable. For example, the highest numeric frequency
for intercourse was 150. For that variable, a response of “too many to count” was
replaced with 155. Responses such as “many” and “several” were also coded this way.
Seventy-three responses were recoded in this manner. Answers such as “cannot
remember” were left blank. If a range was provided, the highest number was taken. If a
number was given with a plus sign after it, the number given was entered.
The age when the abuse began and the number of years abused were obtained by
asking participants to circle all ages during which CSA occurred from a scale of 1 to 17
provided for each the thirteen behavioral descriptions of CSA. The youngest age
reported for any abuse signified the youngest age of abuse. The number of years abused
was the sum of years during which CSA occurred. For instance, if a participant circled
12, 13, and 14 as the ages during which touching of their sexual parts occurred and
circled 13, 14 and 15 as the ages during which intercourse occurred, then the number of
years abused would be 4.
The participant was asked if he/she was able to tell anyone about the abuse. “No”
answers received a value of one and “yes” answers received a value of two.
Participants were asked how well they knew the abuser by checking one of four
rank ordered descriptions ranging from “Not known to you before the abuse occurred” to
Extremely well known to you”. A point value ranging from one to four was assigned to
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each response with four equaling “extremely well known”. The value assigned to the
response checked by the participant was the score.
Whether the perpetrator was a parent was determined by asking a yes/no question
with “no” answers receiving a value of one and “yes” answers receiving a value of two.
A second question asked participants to check whether the perpetrator(s) was (were) a
biological mother, biological father, stepmother or stepfather.
Sexual violence was assessed by asking whether the abuse involved force, injury
or rape. “No” answers received a value of one and “yes” answers received a value of two.
The degree of fear, humiliation, and fearfulness associated with the CS A, were
each assessed via a seven point Likert scale, with points ranging from one (1) to seven (7)
and with seven representing the greatest degree of the given quality.
Finally, a question regarding corroboration or evidence that the CSA occurred
was included. Participants were asked whether “anyone or anything helped to provide
evidence that these sexual experiences occurred”. 4tNo” answers received a value of one
and “yes” answers received a value of two. If the answer was yes participants were asked
to check the nature of the evidence from among a list of sources.
Memory for the Abuse
Disrupted memory for CSA was assessed by asking those who report a history of
abuse if there was ever a time during which they were unable to remember any of the
abuse, even if they had been asked. “No” answers received a value of one and “yes”
answers received a value of two. Two questions regarding the nature of the recovered
memories were included for exploratory purposes. The first inquired about whether the
returned memory was experienced as familiar or as foreign, while the second one
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inquired about whether the returned memory was experienced as involving disconnected
sensations or visual images, sounds, smell or touches.
Dissociative Experiences
The dissociation score was obtained from the Dissociative Experiences Scale C
(DES C) (Wright & Loftus, 1999), a 28 item self-report scale modified from the original
scale. The DES (Bernstein & Putnam, 1986) was developed originally from clinical data
of those diagnosed with a dissociative disorder and from interviews of clinical treatment
providers. Test-retest reliability for four to eight weeks was .84 (p < .0001, N = 26). The
median correlation coefficient for items scores was .60. Split half reliability coefficients
ranged from .71 to .96 (p < .0001) depending on the population. Wright and Loftus
report that Cronbach’s alpha is typically .90 or above for the DES.
Bernstein and Putnam developed the DES to be used with non-clinical as well as
clinical populations. However when used with non-clinical populations, Wright and
Loftus (1999) noted that variability is frequently restricted and a significant floor effect
occurs with a positive skewing of the distribution. While the original scale asks
participants to rate the percentage of time during which they experience any of the 28
experiences listed, the DES C asks participants to rate the degree to which they have the
experiences compared to other people. Wright and Loftus compared the DES C with the
DES II (a revised version with a slightly different response options from the original) in a
non-clinical population of college undergraduates. While the distribution for the DES II
was highly skewed (skewness = 2.08, SE = .30), the distribution for the DES C was
essentially unskewed (skewness = -.12, SE = .30). Wright and Loftus also report a
Cronbach’s alpha of .93 for the DES C.
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Each question of the DES C was rated on an 11 point scale with 1 representing
that the experience happens to the individual “much less than others” and 11 representing
that the experience happens to the individual “much more than others”. The 11 point
scale was used to maintain consistency with the DES II, which rates responses from 0 %
to 100 % of the time in which the participant rates the phenomenon to occur in 10 %
increments. Scores on each item can range from 0 to 100. The scores were totaled and
divided by the total number of items (28) to provide a final score. Total scores ranged
from 0 to 100.
Procedure
Students in psychology or other community college or university courses were
asked during class if they would complete a survey regarding childhood traumatic
experiences. All students were eligible to participate. In some courses, extra credit was
available for participation. Those who were willing to participate were informed that their
participation or decision not to participate would have no bearing on their standing in the
class during which the request was made (apart from any available extra credit). Students
completed the survey during the class period and returned the survey to the primary
investigator.
Students were given a survey to complete in class with an attached cover letter
that informed them of the nature of the questionnaire. It also stressed the appropriateness
of stopping if the questions were experienced as distressfiil. The cover letter stated that it
and the returned survey serve as implied consent to participate in the study. The letter
also included an address where the participant could write to receive survey results and a
phone number to call if questions arose or if the survey questions caused significant
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distress. Finally, the number of the Office of Patient Relations with Loma Linda
University is provided so the participant may speak to an uninvolved third party
regarding the survey. Most students completed the survey in 20 to 25 minutes.
Students attending three southern California universities were provided with a
debriefing form upon completion of the survey that further explained the nature of the
study and provided more detailed information about how to seek assistance should
distress occur. This debriefing statement was required by one of the universities and was
therefore added to the protocol for all further data collection.
Operationalized Hypotheses and Analyses
Hypothesis 1. The mean score on the DES C is significantly higher for those with
disrupted memory for CSA than it is for those with continuous memory. Differences
were determined using an independent means, one tailed t test. This and all statistical
tests of hypotheses are to be significant at the .05 level.
Hypothesis 2. Reversed standardized (Z scores) TMAS scores (short version)
combined with standardized MCSDS scores creates a repressive coping score with high
scores representing greater repressive coping. The repressive coping score is significantly
higher for those with disrupted memory for CSA than it is for those with continuous
memory. Differences were determined using an independent means, one tailed t test.
Hypothesis 2 was also operationalized as follows: The relationship between TMAS
scores (short version) and disrupted memory for sexual abuse scores is moderated by
MCSDS scores. (As MCSDS score increase, TMAS scores become negatively correlated
with disrupted memory scores.) This interaction effect was tested using a moderated
logistic regression.
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Hypothesis 3. Repressive coping scores (see Hypothesis 2) are negatively
correlated with DES C scores in individuals with memory disruption for CSA. The
association was determined using Pearson’s Correlation Coefficient.
Hypothesis 4. The age at which the CSA began, how well known the abuser was,
greater fear related to the CSA, whether the CSA involved penetration and having
experienced violence are the characteristics of CSA that best predict disrupted memory
for CSA. The relationships were determined using stepwise logistic regression.

Results
Students in the classes surveyed returned 492. Of those, 41 students returned
questionnaires that were incomplete, as they were instructed to do if they did not wish to
participate in the study. This resulted in a 92 % return rate. Of those returned, four
questionnaires contained responses that were uninterpretable or appeared to be invalid,
resulting in a total sample of447.
Initial Variable Screening (Total Sample)
MVssing and Ambiguous Values
Four cases did not provide information on disrupted versus continuous memory for CSA
and were eliminated from analysis, reducing the total sample to 443. For ethnicity, one
missing value was assigned a code of 10 indicating that ethnicity had not been noted.
Missing item values for the MCSDS and TMAS scales, both of which are true/false
scales, were replaced with the subject mode. Item values for the DBS C scale, which are
continuous, were replaced with the subject mean. One missing DBS C total score was
replaced with the variable mean.
Outliers
Two values from the DBS C total score variable were discontinuous from the
distribution and at least 3 standard deviations from the mean and were removed from the
data analyses, leaving a total sample for analysis of 441.
Characteristics of the Respondents
Total Sample
Of the total sample 30 % (N = 134) were male and 70 % (N = 307) were female.
The mean age was 24.47 (SD = 7.59) ranging from 18 to 57. Approximately, forty-two
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percent identified themselves as Anglo-American, 14 % as African American, 16 % as
Mexican-American, 1 % as other Hispanic/Latino, 5 % as Asian American, 2 % as
Pacific Islander* 1 % as Native American, 5 % as multi-ethnic, 8 % as other and less than
one percent did not indicate ethnicity.
CSA Sample
Sixty-two percent of the total sample of 441 reported a history of CSA before the
age of 18 (N - 275). The CSA sample differed very little from the total sample. Of the
CSA sample 28 % (N = 76) were male and 72 % (N = 199) were female. The mean age
was 24.07 (SD - 7.84) ranging from 18 to 57. Approximately, thirty-nine percent
identified themselves as Anglo-American, 17% as African American, 17 % as MexicanAmerican, 5 % as other Hispanic/Latino, 5 % as Asian American, 1 % as Pacific Islander,
2 % as Native American, 5 % as multi-ethnic, 9 % as other and less than one percent did
not indicate ethnicity. See Table 1 for a comparison of the total sample to the CSA
sample. Of those who reported a history of CSA, approximately 30% (N = 84) reported
that they could not remember the abuse for a period of time, even if they had been asked,
and approximately 70%(N = 191) reported continuous memory for the abuse.
Statistical Assumptions
Prior to conducting the primary analyses, variables were screened to determine if
they met the assumptions required for the statistical procedure used.
The independent samples t test and Pearson’s Correlation Coefficient analyses
used in hypotheses one, two, and three, require that the assumptions of normality,
linearity, and homogeneity of variance/homoscedasticity be met while logistic regression
analyses used in hypotheses two and four do not (Mertler & Vannatta, 2002; Tabachnick
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& Fidell, 1996). However, logistic regression raises issues regarding ratio of cases to
variables and multicolinarity among predictor variables to be addressed (Tabachnick &
Fidel, 1996).
Table 1
Comparison of Total Sample (N — 441) and CSA Sample (N — 275) in Frequency and
Percentages

Frequency or Mean

Percent

Total

CSA

Total

CSA

Male

134

76

30.0

27.6

Female

307

199

70.0

72.4

24

24

na

na

42.0

Demographics
Gender

Age (M)
Ethnicity
Anglo-American

185

106

Mexican American

71

48

16.1

17.5

African American

63

46

14.3

16.7

Other Hispanic/Latino

29

15

6.6

5.5

Asian American

23

13

5.2

4.7

Pacific Islander

8

2

1.8

.7

Native American

6

5

1.4

1.8

Multi-ethnic

20

14

4.5

5.1

Other

35

25

7.9

9.1

1

1

.2

.4

Did not indicate

Note: CSA = childhood sexual abuse

38.5
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Normality
The analyses used in hypotheses one, two, and three require that the assumption
of normahty be met in continuous variables. To assess whether these variables (DBS C
scores, TMAS scores, MCSDS scores, and repressive coping scores) were relatively
normally distributed, histograms and box plots were created. For all four variables the
histograms and box plots indicated that the assumption of normahty was met. (See
Appendix D for histograms.)
Linearity and Homogeneity of Variance
For the independent samples t tests comparing DBS C scores and repressive
coping scores between disrupted versus continuous memory groups, homogeneity of
variance was determined by examination of the ratio of standard deviations. Inspection
of the ratio between the DBS C scale standard deviation for the continuous memory
group (SD = 15.95) and the disrupted memory group (SD = 19.82) indicated that the
assumption of homogeneity of variance was met. However, for the DBS C, Levine’s test
for equahty of variances was violated (7.026; p. = .009) and therefore, values assuming
unequal variance were used in interpreting t test results. The ratio between the repressive
coping scale standard deviation for the continuous memory group (SD = 1.58) and the
disrupted memory group (SD = 1.87) indicated that the assumption of homogeneity of
variance was met. Also, Levine’s test for equahty of variances was not violated.
For the Pearson r Correlation Coefficient analysis between repressive coping and
DBS C scores used in hypothesis 3, examination of the standardized residuals scatter plot
suggested that the assumptions of linearity and homoscedasticity were met. (See
Appendix E for the scatterplot.)
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Ratio of Cases to Variables and Multicolinearity
Logistic regression models for hypotheses two and four revealed no inordinately
large parameter estimates or standard errors (See Tables 4 and 5). Therefore the ratio of
cases to variables was estimated to be in the acceptable range. A bivariate correlation
matrix revealed no high correlations among predictor variables, thus indicating no
significant multicolinearity.
Descriptive Statistics
Statistical analyses were performed using SPSS. Descriptive statistics were
computed for continuous variables (see Table 2). The present sample was expected to
produce DBS C scores, repressive coping scores, earliest age of CSA and number of
years abused comparable to those found in similar non-clinical samples of individuals
with CSA.
Normative information for DBS C scores in non-clinical samples of individuals
with a history of CSA has not been published. However, the mean DBS C score of 26.41
(SD = 17.37) in this total sample was comparable to previously published normative data
with students. Also, Sheiman (1999) used the DBS with a non-clinical sample and had
lower scores than those obtained in this study. This was expected because the DBS is
known to have a floor effect with non-clinical samples while the DBS C has been
normally distributed in this group (Wright & Loftus, 1999).
Weinberger’s Repressive Coping Scale also has not been used previously with
non-clinical groups with a history of CSA. This, in addition to the revised scoring
system, prevents comparison with normative data. However, the MCSDS and the TMAS
from which the repressive coping scale was calculated, have produced mean scores in
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non-climcal, non-CSA samples comparable to the mean scores obtained in this study
(Myers & Brewin, 1994: MCSDS M = 12.81, TMAS M = 9.19; Davis, 1987: MCSDS M
= 14.98, TMAS M = 8.29).
Table 2
Descriptive Statistics for Continuous Variables in the Total Sample and the CSA Sample
(in bold print)

Measure

N

M

SD

Min. - Max.

DBS C (total)

441

26.41

17.37

0.00 - 80.00

DES C (CSA)

275

29.15

17.84

0.00-80.00

TMAS (total)

441

8.00

4.48

0.00-19.00

TMAS (CSA)

275

8.28

4.65

0.00 -19.00

MCSDS (total)

441

16.14

5.59

1.00-32.00

MCSDS (CSA)

275

16.28

5.34

1.00-31.00

Repressive Coping (total)

441

0.00

1.65

-4.95-4.43

Repressive Coping (CSA)

275

0.00

1.67

-4.95-3.58

No. of CSA Incidents

206

0.00

.88

-.43-6.53

Self-consciousness

264

4.02

2.40

1.00-7.00

Humiliation

265

3.74

2.50

1.00-7.00

Psychol. Qualities Factor

262

0.00

.95

-1.33 -1.97

Number of Years Abused

275

2.67

2.05

1.00 -13.00

Youngest Age of CSA

275

8.90

5.29

0.00-17.00

Note: CSA - Childhood sexual abuse; DES C = Dissociative Experiences Scale, Form C;
TMAS = Taylor Manifest Anxiety Scale; MCSDS = Marlow-Crowne Social Desirability Scale.
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The mean earliest age of CSA reported in Melchert’s non-clinical sample was
10.18 (SD - 4.23) years, which is somewhat higher than the mean age of 8.90 (SD =
5.29) reported in this study. The difference may be due to Melchert’s definition of CSA
(unwanted sexual activity as a child) in contrast to the definition used here: sexual
experiences with someone five years older, or with someone who wasn’t five years older,
but with whom one felt obligated to cooperate. It is also possible that earlier experiences
of CSA were less likely to be defined as “unwanted”. It may also be that “sexual
activity” connoted more activity on the part of the child and therefore was reported as
occurring less frequently at younger ages. Finally, the number of years in which CSA
took place has not been previously published in non-clinical samples.
Qualities of CSA
Of the eight types of CSA included in the survey, five were divided into two
categories. The first category involved having been the “recipient” of the abuse, or
having the activity performed upon the victim, while the second involved having been the
“actor”, or having to perform an activity on another perpetrator or other person, at the
perpetrator’s request or insistence. The five divided types included exposure of sexual
parts, nude photography, touching sexual parts, digital or object penetration and oral
copulation. Three types - verbal request, kissing and hugging, and intercourse - were not
divided into two categories. Of the five divided types, having “received” the abuse was
more frequently endorsed than having been the “actor” in all types except nude
photography in which “receiving” and “acting” were endorsed equally and least
frequently (5.1 % of those indicating abuse). The most frequently endorsed types of
abuse among those who reported CSA, when “receiving” and “actor” categories were
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combined, were touching sexual parts (60.4 %) and exposure of sexual parts (60.4 %).
See Table 3 for the numbers and percentages of participants with CSA who endorse each
type of abuse.
Table 3
Participants with CSA Who Endorsed Each Type ofAbuse

N

%

Touching sexual parts (“receiving” and “acting”)

166

60.4

Exposure of sexual parts (“receiving” and “acting”)

166

60.4

Invitation to do something sexual

136

49.5

Kissing and hugging

134

48.7

Intercourse

112

40.7

Penetration digitally or with object (“receiving” and “acting”)

92

33.5

Oral copulation (“receiving” and “acting”)

88

32.0

Nude photography (“receiving” and “acting”)

14

5.1

Note: Participants may have endorsed more than one type of abuse; CSA = childhood sexual abuse

Of participants who reported CSA, 28 % (N = 78) said they could have provided
corroboration for the abuse; 53% (N = 146) reported they could not have, and 19 % (N =
51) did not respond to the question. Because of ongoing questions regarding the validity
of recovered memories of CSA following a period of disrupted memory, a Chi square
analysis was conducted between disrupted vs. continuous memory for abuse and
corroboration vs. no corroboration. The analysis revealed that there were a greater
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number of those with disrupted memory for CS A who could have provided corroboration
than was expected (two tailed Chi square (1) = 9.74, p = .002).
Analyses of the Stated Hypotheses
Hypothesis One
Hypothesis one stated, “Dissociative tendencies are found more in those with
disrupted memory for CSA than in those with continuous memory.” Using an
independent means, one-tailed t-test, this hypothesis was supported
(t [132] = -4.23; M = 36.36 (SD = 19.82); M = 25.99 (SD = 16.00); p = .009).
Hypothesis Two
Hypothesis two stated, “Repressive coping is found more in those with disrupted
memory for CSA than in those with continuous memory. Alternately, as social
desirability increases there is a negative correlation between manifest anxiety (low) and
memory disruption for CSA (high).” In operationalized terms, hypothesis two stated,
“Reversed standardized (Z scores) TMAS scores (short version) combined with
standardized MCSDS scores creates a repressive coping score with high scores
representing greater repressive coping. Repressive coping scores are higher in those in
those with disrupted memory for CSA than in those with continuous memory.” Using an
independent means, one-tailed t-test, this hypothesis was not supported (t [271] = 1.58; M
= 0 (SD = 1.59); M = -.28 (SD = 1.87); p = .093).
Hypothesis 2 was also operationalized as follows: “The relationship between
TMAS scores (short version) and disrupted memory for sexual abuse scores is moderated
by MCSDS scores. (As MCSDS scores increase, TMAS scores become negatively
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correlated with disrupted memory scores.)” This alternative analysis was included to
examine the possible interaction effect among the three variables.
Results again failed to support the stated hypothesis. A test of block one against a
constant - only model was statistically reliable (Chi sq. (l) = 5.111;p = .024) indicating
that TMAS scores reliably distinguished between those with disrupted and those with
continuous memory for CSA, with those with disrupted memory having higher TMAS
scores. However, the variance in memory state accounted for was small, with a Cox &
Snell R2 of .02. Prediction success was moderate with 69.5 % of memory status correctly
predicted. A test of block two against a constant - only model was not statistically
reliable, indicating that MCSDS and TMAS scores did not reliably distinguish between
disrupted and continuous memory for CSA. Finally, a test of block three against a
constant - only model was statistically reliable (Chi sq. (3) = 8.324; p = .040), indicating
that the interaction term reliably distinguished between disrupted and continuous memory
for CSA. Again however, in this final model, variance in memory state accounted for
remained small, with a Cox & Snell R2 of .03. Table 4 shows regression coefficients,
Wald statistics, and odds ratio for each block. In the final model, odds ratios are
relatively small, and according to the Wald criterion, only increasing TMAS (anxiety)
reliably predicted disrupted memory for CSA (Wald = 3.966, p = .046).
In summary, while the combined influence of the three variables in the final
model reliably distinguished disrupted from continuous memory, the overall magnitude
of the effect was small. In addition, the one significant predictor was higher TMAS
scores, in contrast to the hypothesis, which predicted that TMAS scores would be lower
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in the disrupted memory group. This analyses, therefore, also does not support the stated
hypothesis.
Table 4
Regression Coefficients for Variables in Logistic Regression for Hypothesis Two

Variables in Block 1
TMAS
Constant

B

Wald

df

Sis.

ExpfB)

.063

5.060

1

.024

1.066

-1.383

Variables in Block 2
TMAS

.073

5.454

1

.020

1.076

MCSDS

.020

.534

1

.465

1.020

Constant

-1.774

Variables in Block 3
TMAS

.064

3.966

1

.046

1.067

MCSDS

.022

.607

1

.436

1.022

Interaction Term

-.216

2.649

1

.104

.806

Constant

-1.823

Note: TMAS - Taylor Manifest Anxiety Scale; MCSDS = Marlow-Crowne Social Desirability Scale.
Hypothesis Three

Hypothesis three stated, “Repressive coping scores (as described in Hypothesis 2)
are negatively correlated with DES C scores in individuals with memory disruption for
CSA.” Using Pearson’s Correlation Coefficient, this hypothesis was supported (r = .507, p<.0001).
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Hypothesis Four
Hypothesis four stated, “Having been younger when the CSA began, having
known the abuser well, having feared for one’s life, whether CSA involved penetration
and having experienced violence or use of force, are the quahties of CSA that best
characterize those with disrupted memory for CSA.” Stepwise logistic regression
provided minimal support for this hypothesis. As predicted, having experienced violence
or use of force and having experienced penetration predicted memory disruption for
CSA; however none of the other hypothesized variables contributed significantly to the
regression equation. Regression results indicated that this model, against a constant only model, was statistically reliable (Chi sq. (2) = 17.24; p < .0001) indicating that
penetration and force/violence reliably distinguished between those with disrupted and
those with continuous memory for CSA. The variance in memory state accounted for
was moderately small with a Cox & Snell R2 of .067. Prediction success was moderate
with 69.8 % of memory status correctly predicted with 79 cases with disrupted memory
and 168 with continuous memory observed.
A second stepwise logistic regression analysis was conducted that included the
two variables from the first model that predicted disrupted memory for CSA:
violence/force and penetration. In addition, seven other available variables representing
characteristics of CSA were included: whether the perpetrator was a parent, degree of
humiliation experienced, degree of self-consciousness experienced, whether the victim
was able to tell anyone at the time, whether evidence could have been provided if needed,
the number of years CSA was experienced, and the number of abusive incidents.

Neither of the predictor variables from the first analysis remained significant
predictors in this model. Instead, degree of humiliation, whether evidence could have
been provided, and the number of years abused were the predictor variables that best
distinguished disrupted memory from continuous memory for CSA. Regression results
indicated that the final model, against a constant — only model, was statistically reliable
(Chi sq. (3) - 34.79; p < .0001) indicating that greater humiliation, being able to provide
evidence, and a greater number of years abused reliably distinguished between those with
disrupted and those with continuous memory for CSA. The variance in memory state
accounted for was moderate with a Cox & Snell R2 of. 19. Prediction success was also
moderate with 69.9 % of memory status correctly predicted with 60 cases with disrupted
memory and 106 with continuous memory observed. Table 5 shows regression
coefficients, Wald statistics, and odds ratio for this model.
Additional Analyses
In an attempt to strengthen the model of characteristics of CSA explaining
disrupted memory for CSA, an exploratory factor analysis was conducted to determine if
any underlying structures for characteristics of CSA might emerge. In addition to the
twelve variables included in the previous logistic regressions, thirteen variables
representing types of CSA were included. One variable pertaining to penetration Was
eliminated, because inclusion of all types of CSA reflected degrees of penetration.
Therefore, a total of 24 variables representing quahties of CSA were included in an initial
analysis. Examination of the eigenvalues and the scree plot supported a four to eight factor solution. Subsequent principal axis factor analyses using direct oblimin rotation
found that the three, five and eight-factor solutions provided factors that made little
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theoretical sense and six and seven factor solutions failed to converge at 25 rotations. A
four-factor solution provided theoretically coherent factors with the simplest structure.
Four variables (famiharity with the perpetrator, number of years abused, whether
evidence could have been provided, and youngest age at which CSA was experienced)
were eliminated because they did not load highly on any factor.
Table 5
Regression Coefficients for Variables in Second Logistic Regression For Hypothesis
Four

Variables in Step 1

B

Wald

df

Sig.

Exp(B)

.344

13.211

1

.0001

1.411

-1.117

9.582

1

.002

.327

.382

14.162

1

.0001

1.465

.204

7.717

1

.005

1.226

-1.191

10.186

1

.001

.304

No of Years Abused

.351

11.839

1

.001

1.421

Constant

-.491

No. of Years Abused
Constant

-1.577

Variables in Step 2
Evidence
No. of Years Abused
Constant

-.088

Variables in Step 3
Humihation
Evidence

Four factors emerged that generally represented: 1) CSA involving less physical
intrusiveness or none, 2) the psychological impact of the CSA, 3) CSA involving
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pornographic exploitation, and 4) CSA involving significant physical intmsiveness. The
results are summarized in Table 6, which lists the rotated factor loadings for all items
included in the final factor analysis and in Table 7, which provides the four-factor
correlation matrix. The four factors recapture 47 % of the variance in the individual
variables.
Factor 1: Less Physically Intrusive CSA
Of the 20 variables that remained in the final model, eight loaded on the first
factor. Six variables loaded representing less physically intrusive types of CSA, ranging
from an invitation to do something sexual to touching of sexual parts. A seventh variable
included was the “acting” component of digital penetration or penetration with an object.
This factor, then, is composed of progressively more physically intrusive types of CSA,
up through assuming the “acting” role in digital penetration. An eighth variable loading
on this factor represented greater frequency of CSA incidents. All variables in this factor
loaded positively with a rotated eigenvalue of 5.510.
Factor 2: Psychological Impact of CSA
A second factor included six variables that represent the psychological impact of
the CSA experience(s). Three variables that loaded are responses to direct questions
about the psychological impact: degree of humiliation experienced, degree of fear, and
degree of self-consciousness. Three others represent circumstances of the CSA that
could reasonably be assumed to contribute to the psychological distress of the experience:
being physically forced, hurt or raped; not being able to tell anyone; and having the
perpetrator be a parent. All variables in this factor loaded positively with a rotated
eigenvalue of 3.375.

Table 6
Factor Analysis Component Loadings for Characteristics of CSA Variables
Variable

Comp. 1

Comp. 2

Comp. 3

Comp. 4

Exposure of sexual parts (“receiver”) .728

.000

.000

.100

Exposure of sexual parts (“actor”)

.686

.000

.000

.000

Kissing and hugging

.668

-.104

.000

.000

Touching sexual parts (“actor”)

.668

.000

.000

.000

Invitation to do something sexual

.660

.000

.000

.000

Touching sexual parts (“receiver”)

.624

.114

.000

-.180

Digital/object penetration (“actor”)

.360

173

.000

-.243

Frequency of CSA incidents

.359

.000

.000

.000

Humiliation

117

.902

.000

.000

Fear

.124

.871

.000

.000

Self-consciousness

.000

.815

.000

.000

Force, injury, or rape

.000

.561

.000

-.230

Inability to tell someone

.000

.454

.000

.206

Was perpetrator a parent

.152

.346

115

.000

Nude photos or video (“actor”)

.000

.000

.649

.000

Nude photos or video (“receiver”)

.000

.000

.646

.000

Oral copulation (“receiver”)

.000

.000

.000

-.811

Oral copulation (“actor”)

.116

.000

.112

-.603

Intercourse

.111

.000

.000

-.567

Digital penetration (“receiver”)

.208

.291

.000

-.389

Note: CSA - childhood sexual abuse; Comp. 1 = Less physically intrusive CSA; Comp. 2 = Psychological
impact of CSA; Comp 3 = Pornographic exploitation; Comp. 4 = Significantly intrusive CSA.
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Factor 3: Pornographic Exploitation
A third factor includes two variables that represent a CSA experience of either
being photographed or videotaped while nude or taking nude photographs or video of
someone else. The two variables in this factor loaded positively with a rotated
eigenvalue of 1.460.
Factor 4: Significantly Physically Intrusive CSA
A fourth factor, physically intrusive CSA, includes variables representing
“receiving” digital penetration or penetration with an object, being the “actor” for oral
copulation, “receiving” oral copulation, and intercourse. All variables in this factor had
negative values on the factor loadings with a rotated eigenvalue of 1.150.
Table 7
Factor Correlation Matrixfor Characteristics of CSA Factors

Factor

1

2

3

4

1

1.000

.157

.128

-.599

2

.151

1.000

0.000

0.000

3

0.000

0.000

1.000

-.227

4

-.599

0.000

-.227

1.000

Note: CSA = childhood sexual abuse
Stepwise logistical regression (forward conditional) was conducted again to
include the four CSA characteristics factors to determine whether they improved the
ability of the previous logistic regression model to predict disrupted memory for CSA. In
addition to the four factors, two variables from the previous logistic analysis that
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predicted disrupted memory and did not group with the four factors were included
(whether evidence could have been provided and number of years abused). A third
variable that predicted disrupted memory in the previous model, humihation, was not
included because it was included in the psychological quahties factor.
Table 8
Regression Coefficients for Variables in Logistic Regression For Hypothesis Four
Variables in Step 1
No. of Years Abused
Constant

B

Wald

df

Sig.

ExpfB)

.345

13.212

1

.0001

1.411

14.145

1

.0001

1.464

1

.002

.332

-1.567

Variables in Step 2
No. of Years Abused

.381

Evidence

-1.102

Constant

-.074

9.309

Variables in Step 3
Psychol. Quahties

.444

5.394

1

.004

1.559

No of Years Abused

.340

11.149

1

.001

1.405

Evidence

1.115

9.161

1

.002

.328

Constant
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The psychological characteristics of CSA factor, the number of years abused and
whether evidence could have been provided were the predictor variables that best
distinguished disrupted memory from continuous memory for CSA. Inclusion of the
factors did not appreciably improve on the values associated with the model. (The reader
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is invited to compare Tables 4 and 8.) Regression results indicated that the final model,
against a constant - only model, was statistically reliable (Chi sq. (3) = 39.092;
p < .0001) indicating that the psychological qualities of CSA factor, number of years
abused and being able to provide evidence reliably distinguished between those with
disrupted and those with continuous memory for CSA. Also, as before, the variance in
memory state accounted for was moderate, with a Cox & Snell R2 of. 18. Prediction
success was moderate with 68% of memory status correctly predicted with 60 cases with
disrupted memory and 105 with continuous memory observed. While this model was not
significantly better at predicting disrupted memory for CSA, it did incorporate variables
that were more congruent with other studies and therefore was an improvement on the
previous model. Table 8 shows regression coefficients, Wald statistics, and odds ratio for
this model.

Discussion
The primary goal of this study involved determining the factors that distinguish
cases of CSA in which disrupted memory occurs. Hypotheses one through three
considered the role that repressive coping and dissociation play in this phenomenon.
Alternately, hypothesis four considered in a more comprehensive fashion than in past
work, what the circumstances of the abuse itself may contribute to the prediction of
disrupted memory for CSA.
Findings, Implications and Directions for Future Research for Hypotheses One, Two and
Three
Hypothesis One
A primary goal of this study was to determine what role dissociation and
repressive coping play in distinguishing disrupted memory for CSA from continuous
memory. Data from this study reinforce previous research that has consistently shown
dissociative tendencies to predict disrupted memory for CSA (Melchert, 1999; Sheiman,
1999). It is difficult to surmise what such a relationship actually means, because the DES
C is not well connected to any particular theoretical understanding of dissociation.
Because the DES C measures the frequency of non-pathological as well as pathological
experiences, it cannot be concluded that higher DES C scores in those with disrupted
memory for CSA represents maladaptive coping.
Because the DES C includes aspects of normal functioning, it is possible that higher
scores represent a broad cognitive or psychological coping style. In support of this idea,
very preliminary evidence indicates that dissociative tendencies may bear a relationship
to early attachment styles, thus supporting its early presence in psychological
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development. Kobak (2001) found that elementary school age boys with a history of
disrupted attachment to their mothers demonstrated more dissociative tendencies than
other boys. It may be that certain individuals at an early age develop a dissociative
coping style. Then later, dissociative tendencies may intensify in response to trauma.
Hypothesis Two
Hypothesis two revealed that, unlike dissociative tendencies, repressive coping
did not bear a relationship to disrupted memory for abuse. As the reader will recall,
repressive coping is characterized by recalling fewer negative childhood memories in
which the primary emotional quality is fear or self-consciousness. Apparently this does
not translate to periods of disrupted memory for experiences such as CSA in which fear
or self-consciousness are commonly present.
Several possible implications for this finding are apparent. First, it may be that
those with a high degree of repressive coping remember the event but minimize the
emotional impact. Additional analysis offers preliminary support for such a possibility.
Repressive coping was negatively correlated with endorsement of feeling self-conscious
in relationship to the CSA (r - -.228; p < .0001); feeling humiliated (r = -.170; p< .006);
and feeling afraid (r = -.145; p < .019). It was also negatively correlated with the factor
representing the psychological impact of CSA (comprised of self-consciousness,
humiliation, fear, having been hurt, forced or raped; not having been able to tell anyone
about the CSA; and the perpetrator having been one’s parent; r = -.231; p < 0001).
An alternative explanation may be that those with repressive coping may repress
memories of CSA but do not later recall them. This hypothesis would be supported if
those with a documented history of CSA, but who do not remember it, differ in levels of
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repressive coping from others with a history of CSA. This information is not currently
available for this study. Such a study, however, could provide additional information
about the mechanisms of repression in traumatic memory, including the possibility that
memories for CSA may not be remembered due to repression in a way that renders them
less amenable to subsequent resurfacing.
It is also possible that repressive coping did not predict disrupted memories for
CSA because it was by chance that this sample contained a high proportion of those with
dissociative tendencies. As the reader will recall from the results of hypothesis three,
high levels of dissociative tendencies are incompatible with repressive coping. Having a
high proportion of dissociative tendencies would therefore preclude the possibility of
having a high proportion of repressive coping. Inspections of repressive coping scores
offer preliminary support for such an idea, revealing many fewer participants with high
repressive coping scores. In the total sample only 19 % (N = 83) of participants attained
repressive coping scores above the mean, while 81 %(N = 358) obtained scores below
the mean.
A remaining question is whether alternative measurements of repression might
better distinguish disrupted memory for CSA from continuous memory. While this is
possible, it is improbable as long as a low level of reported anxiety remains a central
criterion in the construct of repressive coping, as it is in the measure used presently, and
in the two other primary measures (the Byrne Repression Sensitization Scale; Byrne,
1961; and the Weinberger Adjustment Inventory; Weinberger, 1990). In this sample,
those with disrupted memory for CSA reported higher levels of anxiety on the TMAS
than did either those with continuous memory of CSA or those with no reported history
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of CSA (One-Way ANOVA; F [2, 440] = 4.252, p = .015). While the difference
between those with continuous and disrupted memory only approached significance (p =
.057) it still suggests that those with disrupted memory for CSA are more anxious than
ofhers and are aware of the anxiety.
An emerging construct of repression also supports the centrality of anxiety. It
considers two independent personality dimensions. In this construct, low levels of
vigilance for threat-related information and high levels of cognitive avoidance are
theorized to represent repressive coping. In other words, repressive copers do not look for
anxiety producing stimuli and avoid it if it is found. The Mainz Coping Inventory
measures these dimensions via responses elicited by presentation of vignettes, some with
ego-threatening themes and others with physically threatening themes (Deraksham &
Eysenck, 1997). Central to this measurement of repressive coping is the avoidance of
attending to threat-related environmental stimuli. While this is not a direct measure of
anxiety, avoidance of threatening stimuli would seem to depart very little from a central
theme of avoidance of anxiety awareness. Given this consistent focus in all
measurements of repressive coping, it seems unlikely that the failure of the present
repressive coping scale to predict memory , disruption is an issue related to any single
measurement of repressive coping. Rather it seems that the inability to cognitively attend
to anxiety when it is present is the hallmark feature repressive coping.
As the present discussion is indicating, repressive coping may well represent a
general psychological coping strategy. In addition, some research is suggesting that adult
repressive coping may bear a relationship to an avoidant attachment style in infants.
Deraksham and Eysenck (1997) summarize such evidence in studies by Sroufe and
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Waters (1977) and by Dozier and Kobak (1992). The first piece of evidence involves the
“strange situation”, a diagnostic procedure for assessment of attachment in small children
developed by Ainsworth. It seems that avoidantly attached infants, as they avoid contact
with their mother upon her return, display greater heart rate activity than other infants in
spite of their apparent indifference. Deraksham and Eysenck (1997) argue that this
response bears a resemblance to the repressive coping pattern discovered by Weinberger,
Schwartz and Davidson (1979) in which anxiety is denied in the presence of
physiological arousal. The second study reported that in a sample of individuals
completing an adult attachment styles questionnaire, those endorsing an avoidant
attachment style had higher skin conductance rates than others in the sample. While such
evidence is preliminary, it suggests a possible path by which to clearly define the
repression construct and anchor it to existing, well-supported theories.
Hypothesis Three
The third hypothesis provides additional information regarding the relationship
among repression, dissociation and memory for CSA. As hypothesized, those with
disrupted memory for CSA with higher repressive coping scores typically had lower
dissociative tendencies scores and visa versa. This negative correlation is strong (r. = .507, p < .0001). Further analysis found this moderate independence of repressive coping
and dissociative tendencies to be present across the total sample (r. = -.433, p. < .0001)
as well. These findings suggest that dissociation and repression tend not to operate in the
same individuals.
It may then follow that dissociation and repressive coping represent two distinct
and somewhat mutually exclusive psychological coping strategies or defensive coping
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styles. The distinguishing feature between the two may be that one (dissociation)
manages anxiety by retaining no conscious awareness of it, while the other (repressive
coping) psychically experiences the anxiety then relies upon compartmentalization, as
discussed previously in conceptualizations of dissocation, to somehow cope with the
distress level.
Future research could clarify the nature of repressive coping and dissociative
tendencies by exploring their possible relationship to disturbed attachment with primary
caregivers. Such information could shed light on their primacy (or lack of) in
development of psychological coping styles.
In addition, longitudinal studies could compare the presence of repressive coping
and/or dissociative tendencies in individuals before and after traumatic events occur. This
would help determine to what degree either might determine the nature of response to
traurfia and to what degree trauma is an etiological factor in the presence of each.
In summary, present analyses from hypotheses one, two and three suggest several
things. First, they support previous findings that link dissociation with disrupted
memory. Second, they offer little evidence that repression plays a role in disrupted
memory for CSA in instances in which those memories have returned. Present findings
do not preclude the possibility that repression may play a role in a subset of individuals
with memory loss for CSA for whom memory has not or does not return. Also,
repressive coping, while not causing a loss of memory for CSA, may result in minimizing
the recognized psychological impact of the abuse and.
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Finally, these findings imply that repression and dissociation represent distinct
psychological coping strategies with conscious awareness of anxiety, or lack thereof, as a
defining feature.
Findings, Implications, and Directions for Future Research for Hypothesis Four
The analyses in hypothesis four are unique in their systematic inclusion of
categories of CS A characteristics to determine which uniquely predict disrupted
memories. Cameron (1996) included nine CSA characteristics plus Dissociative
Experiences Scale (DES) scores in a linear regression, but most studies have simply
conducted a series of independent t tests from which it is not possible to determine
relative strength of each variable.
The present findings in hypothesis four converge with other studies that have
found psychologically related qualities of the CSA experience to predict disrupted
memory. As the reader will recall, fear, familiarity with the perpetrator (Sheiman, 1999),
having a parent as perpetrator (Briere, 1989; Cameron, 1996), violence (Briere & Conte,
1993; Cameron, 1996), and experience of threat of harm (Elliott & Briere, 1995) have all
predicted memory disruption. In line with those findings, the psychological qualities
factor emerging from this study (representing fear, violence, threat of harm and the
perpetrator having been a parent) predicted memory disruption for CSA.
The duration of CSA, presently measured as the total number of years during
which CSA took place, also predicted memory disruption for CSA in this study. It has
also borne a relationship to memory disruption in past studies as summarized by Courtois
(1999).
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Other qualities of CSA found in past studies to predict memory loss did not do so
in this study. Physical contact (Sheiman, 1999) and having experienced penetration
(Cameron, 1996) have predicted disrupted memory, but did not contribute to the model of
predictors in this study.
It is puzzling that neither of the two factors that roughly grouped types of CSA
into those involving lesser and greater penetration, predicted disrupted memory. Perhaps
because the factors do not delineate exactly between touching sexual organs and no
touch, as other measures of penetration have, neither predicts disrupted memory. To
further explore this possibility, the original penetration variable delineating between CSA
involving touching of sexual organs and CSA that does not, was included in the final
logistic regression model used in hypothesis four. It did not contribute. However,
examination of the non-significance values of variables that did not enter the logistic
regression model suggested it came closer than any other rejected variable. Furthermore
in a Chi Square test, there was a greater number of those whose CSA involved touching
of sexual organs and who had disrupted memory of abuse than would have been expected
by chance (Chi Square (1) = 6.986, p = .008). So, penetration, when defined as touching
sexual organs and when considered in isolation, distinguishes memory disruption from
continuous memory. Yet it apparently does not contribute to the prediction of disrupted
memory in the presence of many other CSA characteristics.
As discussed previously, being younger at the time of the CSA has predicted
memory disruption in clinical, but not in non-clinical samples. Consistent with previous
findings, being younger did not predict disrupted memory in this study. The present
results further suggest that whether one is in psychotherapy or not determines if being
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younger at the time of CSA will predict having disrupted memory for the abuse.
Alternately, since no theoretical reason for this kind of relationship is readily apparent,
the difference may be an artifact of the study designs. A more careful comparison of
these variables in clinical and non-clinical settings is necessary to confirm this apparent
moderating effect.
In hypothesis four, providing corroboration if needed predicted disrupted memory
for CSA, whereas previous studies have not made this connection. Past studies have
included corroboration information to validate reports of disrupted memory and have not
included it in a regression model. Yet, upon further consideration, corroboration
represents a circumstance of the CSA experience not unlike other qualities of abuse such
as the type of abuse experienced or the relationship with the perpetrator. Therefore
corroboration was included as a characteristic of abuse for analysis.
This finding regarding corroboration is curious. It is not readily apparent why
those with disrupted memory for CSA would be more able to provide corroboration for
the event(s). Perhaps something about the circumstances of the corroboration is related
to disrupted memory. Since psychological distress predicted memory disruption, perhaps
the circumstances of the corroboration represent a source of psychological distress. Of
the 81 participants who signified that evidence could have been supplied, 42 % (N = 34)
indicated that someone else was present during the CSA. It seems plausible that the
presence of one or more witnesses contributed to humiliation, self-consciousness, fear or
other psychological distress, and that this in turn contributed to memory disruption.
Yet other possibilities seem evident as well. It may be that those who have had
trouble remembering CSA are more interested in finding corroboration. They may have
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been more likely to seek out corroboration to verify the abuse than those with continuous
memory. Also, it is possible that memory return for CSA is brought about by the event
or individual that provides corroboration.
Also, the current measure of corroboration is not a straightforward question about
fact. As worded (“If you had needed it, could anyone or anything have helped provide
evidence that this (these) experience(s) occurred?”), it required the participant to evaluate
or make a judgment. Perhaps those with disrupted memory for abuse responded to the
evaluative nature of the question in a unique fashion.
It is also possible that the relationship between corroboration and disrupted
memory represents a social desirability test-taking bias present in those with disrupted
memory. In other words, those with disrupted memory may be more likely to say they
could provide evidence in order to be “cooperative” test takers, although why they would
be more likely to “be cooperative” than others is unclear. Even though the MCSDS has
not been shown to be a good measure of test taking bias (Weinberger, Schwartz, &
Davidson, 1979), a relationship between it and those with disrupted memory might offer
preliminary support for such a hypothesis. However, Pearson’s Correlation Coefficient
revealed no such relationship.
In summary, many of the variables that best predicted CSA memory disruption in
this study were similar to those in other studies. The qualities of the CSA that contribute
to psychological distress appear to be clearly related to disrupted memory, as does the
duration of CSA. Even though penetration appears to bear a relationship to memory
disruption, when all characteristics of CSA were considered, it was not a unique
predictor. Finally, reporting an ability to provide corroboration related to CSA memory

72
disruption. It is unclear if this relationship represents a measurement flaw in this study, a
test taking bias in those with disrupted memory, or if something about the circumstances
of corroboration is related to memory disruption or memory recovery for CS A.
What is perhaps a more important consideration regarding hypothesis four is the
relatively modest relationship between the characteristics of the CSA experience and
memory disruption for the event. As the reader will recall, indices of logistic regression
model fit, including a Cox & Snell R2 of . 18, indicated only a moderate fit of the data to
the model, especially considering that 24 variables were distilled into the final analysis.
Of special note is that the types of abuse, even when grouped into less intrusive and more
intrusive types, thereby representing levels of penetration, appears to have little to do
with memory disruption.
It should be noted, however, that certain characteristics were missing from this
design, including concurrent presence of physical abuse, the number of perpetrators,
threats to ensure secrecy, and whether the individual had positive feelings about the CSA
or felt as though they complied. It is possible that among those not included are
characteristics of the CSA that would improve a final regression model. Perhaps a more
thorough consideration of the elements that comprise psychological distress in a CSA
situation may prove fruitful in subsequent studies. Inclusion of these variables in the
psychological quahties factor developed in this study may strengthen it as a predictor of
CSA memory disruption.
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Limitations
Design and Internal Validity Issues
Because the design of this study is correlational, it cannot be determined from
these findings whether dissociative tendencies or any characteristic of the CSA
experience causes memory disruption for CSA. While reverse causation seems
implausible (memory disruption caused dissociation or characteristics of the abuse), third
variable causation must be considered. Reference has been made to the presence of
witnesses as a possible significant factor in corroboration predicting memory disruption.
It is important to consider that perhaps a quality such as anxiety, which is positively
correlated with DBS C scores in this study (r = .409, p = .01), might cause dissociative
experiences and also cause the CSA to be remembered as more psychologically
disturbing.
Also, because this study only measures one time point, and contains a limited age
range of primarily young adults, it is not possible to detect any changes in psychological
coping that may occur in the years or decades following CSA. While this study detected
dissociative processes in a sample of young adults with disrupted memory for CSA, it is
possible that a sample of middle-aged adults might detect different correlates to disrupted
memory. If this were so, it would support an idea that psychological adaptation to CSA
is an evolving process.
External Validity Issues
CSA rates in this sample were significantly higher (62%) than is believed to occur
in the population. As the reader will recall estimates suggest that 13 to 45% of men and
27 to 45% of women report a history of CSA. This suggests possible problems
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generalizing these results to the general population. The difference may in part be
accounted for by the broad definition of CSA used in this study. It included sexual
activity through age 17, rather than the age of 16, used in some studies. It also did not
restrict reporting to incidents that were unwanted, but rather inquired about any sexual
activity “with someone five years older than you ... or with someone with whom you felt
like you had to cooperate.” In fact the term “sexual abuse” was avoided so as to prevent
the participant from limiting their responses to memories they defined as abusive.
because insight regarding the abusive nature of an event may not always be present.
Measurement Issues
One set of limitations in this study is the problems inherent in a self-report format.
The validity of responses is unknown. Motivation to provide thoughtful, accurate
information in a classroom setting may not have been optimal.
It is also unknown how accurate recall of childhood events is in a self-report
format, although self-reported autobiographical memory is believed to be generally
accurate (Courtois, 1999). Information regarding corroboration helps to establish the
accuracy of such reports to a degree. Accuracy of recall, however, presents specific
concerns in the present context, because the respondents appear to have memory
problems for trauma. In other words, the present study asks individuals with poor
memory for CSA about their poor memory for CSA.
A second set of concerns involves the survey itself. Instructions at times were
complex. For instance, participants were requested for each CSA incident to report only
the most severe thing that occurred at a given time. It may have required considerable
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concentration to think through CS A occurrences and consider only the most severe
activity for any given time, and therefore errors may have occurred.
A second concern regarding the questionnaire involves responses that may have
included consensual intercourse experiences with sexual abuse. Participants were
directed to include sexual experiences with someone “who was five years older than you
or with someone who wasn’t five years older than you, but was someone with whom you
felt like you had to cooperate.” It is possible that instances of consensual intercourse
between a 17 year old and a 22 year old were reported as CSA in a small minority of
cases.
Finally, differences may exist between the repressive coping measure and the
DBS C. Both measure pathological as well as normal behavior (dissociative symptoms in
the DBS C and psychological defensiveness in the repressive coping scale). Yet
dissociative symptoms measured in the DBS C arguably represent a more acute type of
symptomology, while the defensiveness measured in the repressive coping scale may
represent a more generalized personality dysfunction. It cannot be ruled out that such a
difference may be why the DBS C bore a relationship to disrupted memory while the
repressive coping scale did not.
Future Directions
Discussion of possible avenues for future research have been embedded within
the discussions of each hypothesis. A review of these suggests that certain studies would
serve as the next logical steps to follow in this area of study. For instance, since
psychological qualities of the CSA experience are predictors of CSA, strengthening that
factor could be important in better predicting memory disruption. Future studies may
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want to measure other psychological quahties of the CS A experience in addition to the
ones already present in the factor.
Then, before disregarding repressive coping as a factor in memory disruption, it
would be logical to investigate whether it is present to any greater degree in those who
have not recovered lost memories for CSA. As previously mentioned, prospective studies
are finding that a portion of CSA victims do not remember the abuse; therefore repressive
coping could be measured in this group.
Apart from the consideration of psychological qualities, it may be time to move
away from examination of characteristics of abuse as an avenue to understanding
memory disruption for CSA. Since evaluating the CSA experience as distressful does
predict memory disruption, maybe an examination of cognitive evaluative styles would
also be productive.
Another area of inquiry involves improving understanding of what role
dissociation and repressive coping serve in relationship to trauma. A question that has
occurred frequently in the present study is: “Are they symptomatic outcomes of the
experience, or psychological styles that influence the way in which trauma is
psychologically managed?” The tenuous connection between attachment styles and
repressive coping and to an even lesser degree, dissociation, may provide such an avenue.
Future studies investigating dissociation, repressive coping, and memory disruption for
CSA may want to include one or more measurements of attachment styles.
Also, as addition information is gathered regarding predictors of disrupted
memory for CSA, a model may emerge that will clarify the relationship of these variables
to one another and identify any mediating or moderating roles. For example, it may be
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that individuals with dissociative tendencies who have a particular cognitive evaluative
style may perceive CSA to be more distressful and may therefore develop disrupted
memory for the abuse. It may also clarify how central anxiety is to disruptive memory.
Anxiety may be a key component in a cognitive evaluative style, and/or it may
exacerbate dissociative processes and increases the likelihood of memory disruption.
Finally, it would be useful to determine whether this study has measured a
relatively stable, unchanging psychological response to CSA, or has only measured one
point in an evolving process of adaptation. Longitudinal studies or cross-sectional
studies of those at increasing temporal distances from the CSA may help to identify
changes over time in memory and adaptation to CSA.
Conclusion
The study of disrupted memory for CSA is important. Courtois (1999) noted in
her review of studies that investigate memory disruption for CSA that none failed to
document its existence. Given its prevalence, understanding its nature and etiology is
imperative. Efforts, such as this study, to ascertain what psychological mechanisms
account for it and what qualities in the environment may predict it will help to provide
this understanding. Ultimately, at stake is the welfare of those living with the
consequences of CSA. Improved understanding can perhaps aid psychology in
facilitating the best outcomes for such individuals.
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Appendix A
Dear Student,
Thank you for taking time to consider participating in this anonymous survey. Please be
aware that only students 18 years of age and older may participate. If you are younger than
18, please return the materials to the researcher.
By answering the survey questions you are helping to increase our understanding of the nature
and effects of childhood traumatic experiences. Whether or not you have had any traumatic
experiences in your childhood, your answers are still very important to this study. It will
take you approximately 15 minutes to complete this survey.
The questions in this survey ask about traumatic experiences that you might have had as a child,
including memories of childhood sexual abuse, as well as about your tendencies toward social
desirability and any feelings of anxiety that you may experience. If you find that the questions
are disturbing to you, you may stop answering them at any time.
Participation in this study is voluntary. Whether or not you participate will have no
bearing on your grade or standing in any class. This study is in no way affiliated with the
academic institution in which you are enrolled as a student.
By completing and returning this survey you are giving consent for us to use your answers in our
study. Please do not put your name on any of the pages. The survey is anonymous; your name
cannot be linked with your answers to the questions in any way. If you have any questions about
this study, if you should become distressed as a result of your participation and/or you wish to
speak to someone after completing it, you may contact DrJanet Sonne, a licensed psychologist,
or Lorraine Young, a licensed marriage and family therapist, at (909) 558-8710. If you wish to
contact an impartial third party not associated with this study regarding any question or complaint
you may have about the study, you may contact the Office of Patient Relations, Loma Linda
University Medical Center, Loma Linda, CA 92354, phone (909) 558-4647 for information and
assistance.
Your academic institution has approved the distribution of tips survey on your campus. It has
been approved by the Institutional Review Boards of California State University, San Bernardino
and Loma Linda University.
If you wish to receive a summary of the results of this study, please write to the following
address:
T. Lorraine Young, MA; Loma Linda University; Graduate School; Department of Psychology;
11130 Anderson Street; Loma Linda, CA 92350
Please keep this letter for future reference. Thank you.

Jan$ f • Sonne, Ph.D.,
Professor

T. Lorraine Young, MA,
Doctoral Candidate
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Appendix B

The Childhood Trauma and Well-Being Survey
IWhat is your gender?
□ Male
□ Female
2.

What is your age?

3. Of what ethnic group do you consider yourself to be a member?
□
□
□
□
□

Mainstream/Anglo-American
African American
Mexican American
Other Hispanic/Latiho
Other: _______ __________

□
□
□
□

Asian American
Pacific Islander
Native American
Multi-ethnic

4.

For the following questions, please circle either True (T) or False (F),
which ever describes you the best
1.

True

False

Before voting I thoroughly investigate the qualifications of all the
candidates.

2.

T

F

I never hesitate to go out of my way to help someone in trouble.

3.

T

F

It is sometimes hard for me to go on with my work if I am not
encouraged.

4.

T

F

I have never intensely disliked anyone.

5.

T

F

On occasion I have had doubts about my ability to succeed in life.

6.

T

F

I sometimes feel resentful when I don’t get my way.

7.

T

F

I am always careful about my manner of dress.

8.

T

F

My table manners at home are as good as when I eat out in a
restaurant.
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9.

T

F

If I could get into a movie without paying and be sure I was not
seen I would probably do it.

10.

T

F

On a few occasions, I have given up doing something because I
thought too little of my ability.

11.

T

F

I like to gossip at times.

12.

T

F

There have been times when I felt like rebelling against people in
authority even though I knew they were right.

13.

T

F

No matter who I’m talking to, I’m always a good listener.

14.

T

F

I can remember “paying sick” to get out of something.

15.

T

F

There have been occasions when I took advantage of someone.

16.

T

F

I’m always willing to admit it when I make a mistake.

17.

T

F

I always try to practice what I preach.

18.

T

F

I don’t find it particularly difficult to get along with loud mouthed,
obnoxious people.

19.

T

F

I sometimes try to get even rather than forgive and forget.

20.

T

F

When I don’t know something I don’t at all mind admitting it.

21.

T

F

I am always courteous, even to people who are disagreeable.

22.

T

F

At times I have really insisted on having things my own way.

23.

T

F

There have been occasions when I felt like smashing things.

24.

T

F

I would never think of letting someone else be punished for my
wrong-doings.

25.

T

F

I never resent being asked to return a favor.

26.

T

F

I have never been irked when people expressed ideas very different
from my own.

27.

T

F

I never make a long trip without checking the safety of my car.

28.

T

F

There have been times when I was quite jealous of the good
fortune of others.
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29.

T

F

I have almost never felt the urge to tell someone off.

30.

T

F

I am sometimes irritated by people who ask favors of me.

31.

T

F

I have never felt that I was punished without cause.

32.

T

F

I sometimes think when people have a misfortune they only got
what they deserved.

33.

T

F

I have never deliberately said something that hurt someone’s
feelings.

Please circle either True (I) or False (F), which ever describes you the
best

1,

True

False

I believe I am no more nervous than most others.

2.

T

F

I work under a great deal of tension.

3.

T

F

I cannot keep my mind on one thing.

4.

T

F

I am more sensitive than most other people.

5.

T

F

I frequently find myself worrying about something.

6.

T

F

I am usually calm and not easily upset.

7.

T

F

I feel anxiety about something or someone almost all the time.

8.

T

F

I am happy most of the time.

9.

T

F

I have periods of such great restlessness that I cannot sit long in a
chair.

10.

T

F

I have sometimes felt that difficulties were piling up so high that I
could not overcome them.

11.

T

F

I find it hard to keep my mind on a task or job.

12.

T

F

I am not unusually self-conscious.

13.

T

F

I am inclined to take things hard.

14.

T

F

Life is a strain for me much of the time.
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15. T

F

At times I think I am no good at all.

16. T

F

I am certainly lacking in self-confidence.

17. T

F

I certainly feel useless at times.

18. T

F

I am a high-strung person.

19. T

F

I sometimes feel that I am about to go to pieces.

20. T

F

I shrink from facing a crisis or difficulty.
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We thank you for your willingness to answer the following
Questions:
Think back to when you were growing up. Were there any sexual
experiences that may have occurredfor you then? We are interested in
experiences you may have had with someone who was five years older
than you, or with someone who wasnft five years older than you, but was
someone with whom you felt like you had to cooperate. When we use the
term “sexual” we mean a broad range of things - in fact, anything that
might have seemed sexual to you.
1. Did you have any of the following experiences when you were 16 or younger?
*If two or more of the following things happened to you at the same time,
check only one box. Check only the most severe thing that happened. For instance
if one afternoon you were kissed by someone and had intercourse with them, check
only the intercourse box. If you are unsure which is the most severe, check the one
that is the closest to the end of this list.
a. An invitation or request to do something sexual (and this was the most severe
thing that happened this time):
□ This happened to me when I was:
(Circle all ages that apply) 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17
• How many times did this happen? ___________
□ Someone attempted this with me, but was unsuccessful when I was:
(Circle all ages that apply) 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17
□ This did not happen to me, or happened with other sexual experiences
that were more severe.
b. Kissing and hugging in a sexual way (and this was the most severe thing that
happened this time):
□ This happened to me when I was:
(Circle all ages that apply) 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17
• How many times did this happen? ___________
□ Someone attempted this with me, but was unsuccessful when I was:
(Circle all ages that apply) 12 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17
□ This did not happen to me, or happened with other sexual experiences I
that were more severe.
c. Another person showing his/her sexual parts to you (and this was the most severe
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thing that happened this time):
□ This happened to me when I was:
(Circle all ages that apply) 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17
• How many times did this happen? ___________
□ Someone attempted this with me, but was unsuccessful when I was:
(Circle all ages that apply) 12 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17
□ This did not happen to me, or happened with other sexual experiences
that were more severe.
d. At someone’s request or insistence, you showing your sexual parts to another
person (and this was as far as it went):
□ This happened to me when I was:
(Circle all ages that apply) 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17
• How many times did this happen? ___________
□ Someone attempted this with me, but was unsuccessful when I was:
(Circle all ages that apply) 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17
□ This did not happen to me, or happened with other sexual experiences
that were more severe.
e. Another person taking a nude photograph or video of you (and this was as far as it
went):
□ This happened to me when I was:
(Circle all ages that apply) 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17
• How many times did this happen? ___________

f.

□

Someone attempted this with me, but was unsuccessful when I was:
(Circle all ages that apply) 12 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17

□

This did not happen to me, or happened with other sexual experiences
that were more severe.

At someone’s request or insistence, you taking nude photographs or videos of
another person (and this was as far as it went):
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□ This happened to me when I was:
(Circle all ages that apply) 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17
• How many times did this happen? ___________
□ Someone attempted this with me, but was unsuccessful when I was:
(Circle all ages that apply) 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17
□ This did not happen to me, or happened with other sexual experiences
that were more severe.
g. Another person touching your sexual parts (and this was as far as it went):
□ This happened to me when I was:
(Circle all ages that apply) 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17
• How many times did this happen? ___________
□ Someone attempted this with me, but was unsuccessful when I was:
(Circle all ages that apply) 12 3 4 5 6 7 8 910 11 12 13 14 15 16 ll
□ This did not happen to me, or happened with other sexual experiences
that were more severe.
h. At someone’s request or insistence, you touching another person’s sexual parts
(and this was as far as it went):
□ This happened to me when I was:
(Circle all ages that apply) 12 3 4 5 6 7 8 910 11 12 13 14 15 16 17
• How many times did this happen? ____________

i.

□

Someone attempted this with me, but was unsuccessful when I was:
(Circle all ages that apply) 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17

□

This did not happen to me, or happened with other sexual experiences
that were more severe.

Another person penetrating your vagina or anus with fingers or objects (and this
was as far as it went):
□ This happened to me when I was:
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(Circle all ages that apply) 12 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17
• How many times did this happen? ___________
□ Someone attempted this with me, but was unsuccessful when I was:
(Circle all ages that apply) 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17
□ This did not happen to me, or happened with other selual experiences
that were more severe.
j.

At someone’s request or insistence, you penetrating another person’s vagina or
anus with fingers or objects (and this was as far as it went):
□ This happened to me when I was:
(Circle all ages that apply) 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17
• How many times did this happen? ___________
□ Someone attempted this with me, but was unsuccessful when I was:
(Circle all ages that apply) 12 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17
□ This did not happen to me, or happened with other sexual experiences
that were more severe.

k. Another person licking or sucking your vagina or penis (and this was as far as it
went):
□ This happened to me when I was:
(Circle all ages that apply) 12 3 4 5 6 7 8 910 11 12 13 14 15 16 17
• How many times did this happen? ___________

□

Someone attempted this with me, but was unsuccessful when I was:
(Circle all ages that apply) 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17

□ This did not happen to me, or happened with other sexual experiences
that were more severe.

1.

At someone’s request or insistence, you licking or sucking another person’s
vagina or penis (and this was as far as it went):
□ This happened to me when I was:
(Circle all ages that apply) 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17
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•

How many times did this happen?

□ Someone attempted this with me, but was unsuccessful when I was:
(Circle all ages that apply) 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17
□ This did not happen to me, or happened with other sexual experiences
that were more severe.
m. Intercourse:
□ This happened to me when I was:
(Circle all ages that apply) 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17
• How many times did this happen? ___________
□ Someone attempted this with me, but was unsuccessful when I was:
(Circle all ages that apply) 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17
□ This did not happen to me, or happened with other sexual experiences
that were more severe.
n. Please describe other experiences not included in these questions here:

If you answered “this happened to me" or “Some one attempted
..." to any of the previous questions, please continue with
question two below.
Ifyou answered, “This did not happen to me” to all the previous
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questions, please skip to the first question below these long boxes on page
10. The question begins with “Some people have the experience of__

2. Was there ever a time when you were unable to remember any of these sexual
experiences, or parts of them, even if someone had asked you about it?
□ Yes
□ No
If you answered yes, which describes your returned memories the best: (Pick one
answer, please.)
□ The returned memory was familiar to you, as though it was something
you used to know, but forgot for a while OR
□ The returned memory seemed foreign and unfamiliar and it didn’t
feel like a part of your past
If you answered yes above, which describes your returned memories the best:
(Pick one answer, please.)
□ The returned memory felt like a normal memory OR
□ The returned memory involved disconnected sensations or visual
images, sounds, smells or touch.
3. Were you able to tell anyone about the sexual experience(s) at the time in your
life when it (they) occurred?

□ Yes

□ No

4. The person with whom you had the sexual experience(s) you was:
(If more than one person abused you, please answer for the one who was the most
abusive to you, in your opinion.)
□
□
□
□

Extremely well known to you (like a close family member)
Pretty well known to you (someone you knew and saw frequently)
Not very well known to you (someone you may have met a few times)
Not known to you before the abuse occurred
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5. Did any of the sexual experiences involve your parent?
□ Yes
□ No
If yes, then which parent(s)?
□ Biological mother
□ Biological father
□ Step mother
□ Step father
6. Were you physically forced, hurt, injured or raped during (any ol) the sexual
experience(s)?
□ Yes
□ No
7.

During the time of the sexual experience(s), or related to it (them), were you ever
afraid?
Did not
feel
afraid

0
1

8.

Very afraid;
fearful for
my life

0
2

0
3

0
4

0
5

0
6

7

During the time of the sexual experience(s), or related to it (them), did you ever
feel humiliated?
Felt very
humiliated

Did not feel
humiliated

0
1

9.

0

0
2

0
3

0
4

0
5

0
6

0
7

During the time of the sexual experience(s) or related to it (them), did you ever
feel self-conscious?
Did not
feel selfconscious

0
1

Felt
very selfconscious

0
2

0
3

0
4

0
5

0
6

0
7
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10. If you had needed it, could anyone or anything have helped provide evidence that
this (these) sexual experience(s) occurred?
□ Yes
□ No
If yes, then who or what? Check all that apply.
□ Someone saw else it happen.
□ Whoever abused you admitted to it
□ Police report or child protective services report
□ Hospital or doctor report
□ Someone told you that they were abused by the same person
□ Someone told you that they knew of someone who was abused by the
same person
□ Other (Please specify*)

For the following questions, please estimate how much you have any of
these experiences in comparison to other people.
1. Some people have the experience of driving or riding in a car or bus or subway
and suddenly realizing that they don’t remember what has happened during all or
part of the trip. Place a cross to show how much of the time this happens to you
in comparison to other people.

0

0

Much less
than others

0

0

0

0

0

About the same as others

0

0

0

0

Much more
than others

2. Some people find that sometimes they are listening to someone talk and they
suddenly realize that they did not hear part or all of what was said. Place a cross
to show how much of the time this happens to you in comparison to other people.

0

0

Much less
than others

0

0

0

0

0

About the same as others

0

0

0

0

Much more
than others
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3. Some people have the experience of finding themselves in a place and having no
idea how they got there. Place a cross to show how much of the time this happens
to you in comparison to other people.

0

0

Much less
than others

0

0

0

0

0

About the same as others

0

0

0

0

Much more
than others

4. Some people have the experience of finding themselves dressed in clothes that
they don’t remember putting on. Place a cross to show how much of the time this
happens to you in comparison to other people.

0

0

Much less
than others

0

0

0

0

0

About the same as others

0

0

0

0

Much more
than others

5. Some people have the experience of finding new things among their belongings
that they do not remember buying. Place a cross to show how much of the time
this happens to you in comparison to other people.

0

0

Much less
than others

0

0

0

0

0

About the same as others

0

0

0

0

Much more
than others

6. Some people sometimes find that they are approached by people who they do not
know who call them by another name or insist that they have met before. Place a
cross to show how much of the time this happens to you in comparison to other
people.

0

0

Much less
than others

0

0

0

0

0

About the same as others

0

0

0

0

Much more
than others

7. Some people sometimes have the experience of feeling as though they are
stapdjng next to themselves or watching themselves do something and they
actually see themselves as if they were looking at another person. Place a cross to
show how much of the time this happens to you in comparison to other people.

0

0

Much less
than others

0

0

0

0

0

About the same as others

0

0

0

0
Much more
than others
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8. Some people are told that they sometimes do not recognize friends or family
members. Place a cross to show how much of the time this happens to you in
comparison to other people.

0

0

Much less
than others

0

0

0

0

0

About the same as others

0

0

0

0

Much more
than others

9. Some people find that they have no memory for some important events in their
lives (for example, a wedding or graduation). Place a cross to show how much of
the time this happens to you in comparison to other people.

0

0

Much less
than others

0

0

0

0

0

About the same as others

0

0

0

0

Much more
than others

10. Some people have the experience of being accused of lying when they do not
think that they have lied. Place a cross to show how much of the time this happens
to you in comparison to other people.

0

0

Much less
than others

0

0

0

0

0

About the same as others

0

0

0

0

Much more
than others

11. Some people have the experience of looking in a mirror and not recognizing
themselves. Place a cross to show how much of the time this happens to you in
comparison to other people.

0

0

Much less
than others

0

0

0

0

0

About the same as others

0

0

0

0

Much more
than others

12. Some people have the experience of feeling that other people, objects, an$ the
world around them are not real. Place a cross to show how much of the time this
happens to you in comparison to other people.

0

0

Much less
than others

0

0

0

0

0

About the same as others

0

0

0

0

Much more
than others
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13. Some people have the experience of feeling that their body does not seem to
belong to them. Place a cross to show how much of the time this happens to you
in comparison to other people.

()

0

Much less
than others

0

0

0

0

0

About the same as others

0

0

0

0

Much more
than others

14. Some people have the experience of sometimes remembering a past event so
vividly that they feel as if they were reliving that event. Place a cross to show
how much of the time this happens to you in comparison to other people.

- 0

0

Much less
than others

0

0

0

0

0

About the same as others

0

0

0

0

Much more
than others

15. Some people have the experience of not being sure whether things that they
remember happening really did happen or whether they just dreamed them. Place
a cross to show how much of the time this happens to you in comparison to other
people.

0

0

Much less
than others

0

0

0

0

0

About the same as others

0

0

0

0
Much more
than others

16. Some people have the experience of being in a familiar place but finding it
strange and unfamiliar. Place a cross to show how much of the time this happens
to you in comparison to other people.

()

0

Much less
than others

0

0

0

0

0

About the same as others

0

0

0

0

Much more
than others

17. Some people find that when they are watching television or a movie they become
so absorbed in the story that they re unaware of other events happening around
them. Place a cross to show how much of the time this happens to you in
comparison to other people.

0

0

Much less
than others

0

0

0

0

0

About the same as others

0

0

0

0

Much more
than others
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18. Some people find that they become so involved in a fantasy or daydream that it
feels as though it were really happening to them. Place a cross to show how much
of the time this happens to you in comparison to other people.

0

0

Much less
than others

0

0

0

0

0

About the same as others

0

0

0

0

Much more
than others

19. Some people find that they sometimes are able to ignore pain. Place a cross to
show how much of the time this happens to you in comparison to other people.

0

0

Much less
than others

0

0

0

0

0

About the same as others

0

0

0

0

Much more
than others

20. Some people find that they sometimes sit staring off into space, thinking of
nothing, and are not aware of the passage of time. Place a cross to show how
much of the time this happens to you in comparison to other people.

0

0

Much less
than others

0

0

0

0

0

About the same as others

0

0

0

0

Much more
than others

21. Some people sometimes find that when they are alone they talk out loud to
themselves. Place a cross to show how much of the time this happens to you in
comparison to other people.

0

0

Much less
than others

0

0

0

0

0

About the same as others

0

0

0

0

Much more
than others

22. Some people find that in one situation they may act so differently compared with
another situation that they feel almost as if they were two different people. Place
a cross to show how much of the time this happens to you in comparison to other
people.

0

0

Much less
than others

0

0

0

0

0

About the same as others

0

0

0

0

Much more
than others
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23. Some people sometimes find that in certain situations they are able to do things
with amazing ease and spontaneity that would usually be difficult for them (for
example, sports, work, social situations, etc.). Place a cross to show how much of
the time this happens to you in comparison to other people.

0

0

Much less
than others

0

0

0

0

0

About the same as others

0

0

0

0

Much more
than others

24. Some people sometimes find that they cannot remember whether they have done
something or have just thought about doing that thing (for example, not knowing
whether they mailed a letter or have just thought about mailing it). Place a cross
to show how much of the time this happens to you in comparison to other people.

()

0

Much less
than others

0

0

0

0

0

About the same as others

0

0

0

0

Much more
than others

25. Some people find evidence that they have done things that they do not remember
doing. Place a cross to show how much of the time this happens to you in
comparison to other people.

0

0

Much less
than others

0

0

0

0

0

About the same as others

0

0

0

0

Much more
than others

26. Some people sometimes find writings, drawings, or notes among their belongings
that they must have done but cannot remember doing. Place a cross to show how
much of the time this happens to you in comparison to other people.

0

0

Much less
than others

0

0

0

0

0

About the same as others

0

0

0

0

Much more
than others

27. Some people sometimes find that they hear voices inside their head that tell them
to do things or comment on things that they are doing. Place a cross to show how
much of the time this happens to you in comparison to other people.

0

0

Much less
than others

0

0

0

0

0

About the same as others

0

0

0

0

Much more
than others
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28. Some people sometimes feel as if they are looking at the world through a fog so
that people and objects appear far away or unclear. Place a cross to show how
much of the time this happens to you in comparison to other people.

0

0

Much less
than others

0

0

0

0

0

About the same as others

0

0

0

0

Much more
than others

Thank you very much for taking the time to complete this survey.

Appendix C

Debriefing Statement
Thank you again for choosing to participate in this survey. Your contribution is very
important.
The results of this study may provide better understanding regarding which psychological
processes may be at work when traumatic events are not remembered for a period of
time. Specifically, this study investigates whether either dissociation or repression, or
both, account for not remembering experiences of childhood sexual abuse.
Now that you know, it would be most helpful if you would refrain from revealing the
purpose of this survey to other students who may wish to participate. If a student knows
the exact purpose of the study before responding to the questions, his or her answers may
not be valid.
While it is not expected that you will experience any ill effects from having completed
this survey, some of the questions did inquire about memories of sexual abuse. In the
event that you do experience distress (strong, persistent feelings of sadness or anger, for
example), please contact Dr. Janet Sonne or Lorraine Young at (909) 558-8710. Both are
licensed mental health professionals who can discuss your experience with you and make
recommendations for appropriate resolution of your concerns.
Please make sure to keep the introductory letter that came with the questionnaire. It
provides you with other information and phone numbers that may be important to you
regarding this survey.
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Appendix D
Histograms for the CSA Sample

Dissociative Experiences Scale
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SMEAN(DESSCOR2)

Taylor Manifest Anxiety Scale

Std. Dev = 4.65
Mean = 8.3
N = 275.00

TMASSUM2
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Std. Dev= 17.84
Mean = 29.2
N = 275.00
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Appendix D (continued)

Marlow Crown© Scale

Std. Dev = 5.34
Mean = 16.3
N = 275.00

MCSDSUM2

Repressive Coping Scale

Std. Dev = 1.67
Mean = -.04
N = 275.00

SMEAN(REPSCOR2)
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LOMA LINDA, CALIFORNIA
Appendix E
Scatterplot of Standardized Residuals for Hypothesis Three

Scatterplot of Standardized Residuals
For Hypothesis Three
Criterion Variable = DBS C; Predictor Variable = Repressive Coping
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